擬似"牛一"不足信

以美國的各種貸款息率的形勢看來，危機尚未過去。而且，由成品鐵價暴跌和BDI打回05年左右的水平來看，2009年的上半年經濟活動都會大幅減少，這都會大大減低公司的盈利；對於擴張過度的公司更會有虧損甚至倒閉。失業人數和被凍薪的人仕肯定繼續增加；消費繼續不振，而中國的出口則繼續疲弱。

當然，各國央行會大力印銀紙和開工程去谷起經濟活動。縱使真的成功，銀行填好黑洞起碼要過埋08季尾做年結和09第一季才可以"做好盤數"—想做數，光做2008年是不夠的，必須要借用2009第一季方可"乾坤大挪移"。

至於各大白象工程開展；美國肯定要到09年新總統上任才開始討論。就算100日內通過，但是再加上計劃和招標，起碼都要有另外180日時間，然後再加上由中標到開工又需要最少60日的時間，開工後最快30日公司和員工才有糧出。公司項目要打和，以一年的工程，毛利50%，純利15%計算，要9個月約270日。這樣計算的話，少說也要(100+180+60+30+270)=640日即一年零九個月的時間政府送去企業的錢才起效。就算以個人重新有人工就立即加大消費都是370日後的事，再加上55日後才在第一季業積反映，也是425日後即2010第一季的事。縱使股市行先經濟半年，也是2009第三季的事。或許中國能加快工程開展的時間，說什麼也要半年的時間才上馬。而且縱然中國國民能增加消費，最多也是令國內產品增銷，對外國的入口產品改善有限。在這種形勢下，最多是保八、即約2004-2005年間的擴張規模。要回到2006-2007的火紅火綠，則恐怕要全球經濟復甦才成。香港既然深受此兩者的影響，要重新好景恐怕都是三季後的事了。

FED Pumps Money; How Long can these Money Last?

From the week of Oct 13 - Oct 20, FED has dumped a total worth of (43.6+54.3) = 97.9b USD to the market. At the same period, up to now the LIBOR-FED rate spreads have decreased from 309pts and 332pts (on Oct 13) for 1 month and 3 month respectively to 185pts and 219pts respectively. Temporarily the liquidity of banks and hence corporates can restore.


However, the longer term loan rates have climbed from 6.25% (5 year) and 7.50% (10 year) on Oct 13 to 7.39% (5 year) and 8.83% (10 year) on Oct 31; only by the interest cut on Oct 30 the longer term loan have mildly decreased to 7.32% and 8.79% respectively. But, comparing with the same rate 1 year prior (when the sub-prime has emerged but the market is still positive about soft-landing), at 5.11% and 5.16% respectively (and FED Target rate is 4.75% at that time; risk premium is only a mere 36pts and 91pts respectively), the mild drop is insignificant at all. Corporate will still face hardship on raising fund for longer-term projects. Only money for immediate survival is available.


Mortgage Rates have not changed from Oct 30 and remained at high point. Auto Loans also increased by 2 basis pts on average. Now 36 month new car loan is 6.84%, 48 month new car loan is 6.60%, 60 month new car loan is 6.62%, and 72 month car loan is 6.44%. In other words, the loan rates for consumption remains at high.


The only bizzare response is on DJI which makes significant rebound after the injection of 97.9b USD to the market. Yet, the rebound is only back to 9180.69 from 8451.19, by 8.63% only. Comparing with the closing at 2008 first trading date, 13043.96, the discount is still at 42.08%. Even if the FED continues to flood money at the same rate, to restore to the same level, even just by proportion method another 476b USD is needed. It has not included the already existing 700b USD offering by goverment on any single institution for bailing out.


Thus, the rebound effect due to the money pumping perhaps is only a short-term one. In longer term, recession is perhaps still unaviodable.

適得其反：減息只能令市場嫖客化…

現在減息一如嫖客吃偉哥，越吃越要多吃才有效果，不能自拔。

現在有數點可以肯定：
1. 還會繼續減息，
2. 樓市還會下跌，
3. 消費持續減少，
4. 公司經營困難，
5. 銀行增加資本。

這樣一來，幾乎可以估計到銀行會怎樣反應了：
1. 減息後向財政部買錢，但適可而止—充足資本比和夠營運即可，
2. 買來的錢去買短期的國庫債卷，在下次減息前後債券價格上升時再賣出，然後買進下一輪的債券。時間把握得好再加點運，分分鐘可以執到錯價貨。
3. 拉高其餘借貸息率，減低風險。

在這種情況，美國政府注入的資金結果又回到了美國政府去，市場上貨幣短缺。如果懂得把玩銀行出入錢的時刻，則或許可以做美匯兌其他貨幣的長短倉賺錢。甚至對於商品價格亦有參考作用。

對後市的小小估計

以下是在信報的回應：

"羅兄，"行家"二字小弟可不敢當。我的意見不就很明顯嗎：

1. 在樓市尚未喘定(利率下降但房貸息率上升；息差上升)，

2. 銀行不願放貸(利率下降但長債息率上升；息差上升；政府債券孳息下降—銀行寧可買債券都不放數)，

3. 企業盈利下降甚至倒閉(長債息率、息差上升；公司債券孳息上升；資產貶值；公司難以進行大發展；項目減少；人手減少)，

4. 消費減少(失業上升；工資下降；可抵押資產貶值甚至負債)，

5. 工業製品和原材料需求下降，炒作資金亦短缺(CRB和BDI崩盤)，

6. 政府稅收下降，開支卻增加，令債務增加(貨幣供應增加引致貶值)，

7. 資金離開資產市場，再加上消費下跌，引發新一輪的資產跌價潮。

8. 如此直至平衡點到達或者其他因素改變。"

記得要看長息…

昨夜道指大反彈，連商品都上多少，同時LIBOR回落少少，容易令人頭腦發熱。

值得注意的是3A Banking Rate卻和LIBOR背馳上升：5年期已至7.25%；10年期升至8.74%。此外，長期定息房貸息率已經逼近上次減息前的高位：30年期的相差才7個點子；15年期的更已經高過減息前的高位做5.94% (P+1.44)。銀行仍在調高房地產市場的風險溢價。而該市場一日未穩定下來，一日都未可以說到底。

另外，消費信心指數居然跌到得38，和上月的59.8相比，足足跌了46%，就算把過度恐慌的情緒也計算在內，跌幅依然驚人。就算由2008年1月份的87.9跌至6月份的50.4(38點之前的低位)，6個月才跌了43%，可見現時人心有多麼的虛怯。消費不前，公司利潤大幅減少；長期發展的資本又不足，所有的因素都大大影響公司未來的盈利能力。這樣一來，到年底時又將會發現現在的P/E和P/B原來還不算便宜—畢竟EPS是可以負數的也。

當然，有人會認為現時股價已反映(甚至過度反映)對未來的期望。關於這一點，借用曹sir的口頭禪"木宰羊"。可是，如果環境真的那麼好，在沒有通脹的情況下，為什麼銀行的長期借貸和房貸的息率還是只升不跌？

Problems with Gold: Why not Rise?

Traditionally, whenever most of the world currencies face the creditential problems, or whenever the money supplies surges and drives hyper-inflation, gold should be the ideal haven. However, it seems not the case now. Why?

The blind spots of the above position are:

1. It ignored the credit crunch is caused by the burst of property and finance market bubble and hence the massive write-off of asset value. In another sense, it also means the "evaporation" of "money on the book". Thus, money supply is not "excessive" in the market.

2. It ignored the fact that new money supply from FED and central government has not flown to the market, as shown by first LIBOR and now AAA finance and Mortgage Rates. Instead, the lowering of bond yields and the surging JPY and USD show that the money supplied to the bank has returned to the supplier through sales of overseas asset and then purchases of government bonds, particularly US government bond.

3. It ignored the fact that Gold has already hitted new high previously, at the time before credit crunches has become serious. When the risk of inflation drops, the function of gold as hedging against USD has weakened.

4. It ignored the fact that there were speculations on gold market previously, and that the gold futures market has grown 10 times larger (or even above) than the spot market, a hint of speculation over actual demand. With the credit crunch and tightening of new loan, speculators can no longer continue to play at large.

5. It ignored the implausible return of Gold Standard. The nominal World GDP on 2007, in USD, is 54.62 trillion. Meanwhile, the total mined gold weighed about 30,000tonnes. If we use Gold Standard and keep the existing capital reserve ratio at 8% (and hence the same money muliplier) and that the gold mining rate can keep up with the multiplier, then at current price of gold at 730USD/ounce, our gold reserve can only support a size of world economy at nominal GDP of about 9.64trillion USD, only 18% of the current economic activities. Besides, by Gold Standard, the world economy growth is controlled by the demand and supply of gold (and silver) but not by the demand and supply of human consumption and productivity.

Nevertheless, it does not mean that gold price will simply plummet back to before Iraqi War level. It only means that gold price may be up and down with a narrow band-width and a bottom price at 600USD/ounce. If eventually Keynesian economy takes place in the world successfully, a long position for gold may be viable in longer term.

New Home Sales in US vs Mortgage Rate

The so-called improvement on new home sales on september in US is vague: it is better than "consensus" value. But people overlook that the trend is still at the down side.


On the other hand, mortgage rates rising has started to pick up momentum again after the tiny drop last week. The worst is that despite the money injection and improvement on short-term liquidity availability, as shown on LIBOR easing, the long-term borrowing rates are rising. 5-year and 10-year AAA banking and finance rates reached 7.06% and 8.55% respectively.


Under such rates, enterprises can no longer afford any new developments requiring finance from outside. Anticipated profits will be lowered in alignment to the lowering of economic activities. It will further push down the equity market, and in turn worsen enterprises' liability position. Chain reaction will continue until the situation settles.