論政，是論政道，政策，還是政略？我的觀察是多數爭拗是源於一方以政道而另一方以政略論時事。前者著眼的是價值，後者關注的是效果。儘管兩者互有關聯，卻不是一種固定的因果/主從的關係。就以這幾天爭論的事件來說：自由民主法治及其附屬觀點和解決矛盾的理念均是討論價值問題；可是，在國際關係中除了看應不應該這樣做，始終還要問能不能做，怎麼去做，這是方法問題。練先生提出法理上和技術上的依據甚好，至少能用較簡單別人也能接受的方法解決爭端。但是，這卻不表示在現時的情勢中雙方都會依這些框架來解決。於是這要求雙方都會有其他大小“非標”甚至“非法”的動作，這既沒有甚麼出奇，也難以完全可以用政道來規範。因此，當實際分析該事件時，除了看雙方正路的依據，也需要看當時的環境以及可供選擇的方案，甚至是否還要把事件衍生其他的含意。
順帶一提，我一直看到壇友提出“遠交近攻” 甚麼的來提出“聯美制俄”和“聯美制日”。先不論後兩者；遠交近攻既有秦滅六國的成功例子，亦有金滅遼後再滅北宋的失敗例子。聯美制俄還是聯美制日，關鍵根本不是中國民主與否，而是中國究竟會否和能否成為美國最大的競爭對手，或者被美國弄為假想敵。這是以國際權力爭鬥而不是什麼理念為基礎的。美國打伊拉克，是打給世界特別是歐洲看，回應回應你這個歐盟和歐羅有機會帶來的競爭。法國叫得最厲害，皆因西歐中以法國在中東有最大利益。
以現時的情勢來說，美國仍然是把中國當作最大的兩個假想敵之一（另一個當然是俄國）；日本對美國則根本不痛不癢—琪子而已。把日本納入導彈防禦系統是一把雙刃刀：既可以向著中俄，又可以控制了日本本身的軍隊—誰知道美國賣給日本的設備中會不會有”over-ride” 或突然死亡的裝置以防止日本反骨？如此美國對中國” 制日” 毫無需求；至於制俄：要是中國的實力/潛力比俄國更強，制來作甚？反之亦然。美國的重點仍然是讓中俄兩國互相制衡，誰強就傾斜另一方。中俄亦然。所以老鄧的養晦韜光的策略，把盡可能把俄國頂上去然後自己跟在身後，又或者就算俄弱更不能乘機踐踏以多樹美國的敵人才能就中取事，方為對策。
AND :
不論制還是防，甚至攻，說到底都是製造/改變形勢使敵就我。現代的利益並不單止在人和土地，尚有貿易，知識以及衍生出來的價值觀。因此，國際關係變得多樣和自相矛盾化，難以只用一種觀念和策略貫穿。外交和戰略也變得不穩定和多變。要在這種形勢下不被環境牽著走，較簡明的方法就是為自己定位。以中國而言，不爭全球主導，不爭全球第二/最大的” 反第一勢力” ，力爭東亞主導(連日本亦要爭取過來)，力爭最有影響力的第三勢力，從而爭取時間和空間在受最少外力干擾下完成國內政治和經濟的改革，是為最合當前甚至三十年內中國的國際定位。
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
Thursday, March 12, 2009
一於講下花旗銀行
唔好誤會，小弟委實未有時間詳細閱讀花旗報表，唔敢”亂說亂動” 。求求其其看了yahoo finance的季度報表，發現何以在以往06和07年於收入欄沒報cost of revenue，但係到08年無啦啦就有約15% of revenue係 cost of revenue? 如果睇埋季表，點解係6月有25%的cost of revenue，到九月忽然回撥約等於30% 當季revenue作reverse cost of revenue？睇下張balance sheet, 到去年年底資產有1,938b，不過負債就係1,797b，股本得個141b，如果劈走埋D虛到唔恨既goodwill和intangible asset的41b，就得100b咁多，5.2%乍。再睇睇茄殊flow，睇怕又係係D account receivable做過手腳，而且call左一堆loan，所以好野到可以失驚無神拿番89b既未收款番來—但係call左loan，你的尊貴客戶打左柴，以後既收入點算？仲有D不明資金約152b入左operating cash flow到，咁架勢？表面睇Finance的cash flow好似還緊債，但係一睇季表，撞鬼lor，係最後一季借錢12b，問股東度水45b，搞左一大輪，淨現金流出都仲有34b，咁又點算？依家話一二月賺錢，到底夠唔夠俾息？夠唔夠支持資本比率？佢到底仲有幾多at large野？真係木宰羊啦。
廢話到此，眾巴打絲士打點睇？請湧躍討論啦！
廢話到此，眾巴打絲士打點睇？請湧躍討論啦！
Wednesday, March 11, 2009
黃金的多面性
黃金有多面性：既是裝飾用，又因為其保值能力作為管理風險的工具，更有作為貨幣的價值，因此它的行為也很多樣。如果根據去年的數據，黃金作為裝飾用的需求下跌，因此其作為後兩者的目也就顯得重要。此兩者，後面的因素受投資者對紙幣的信心而改變；前者則受其他資本市場表現而轉化。
現時儘管美元被大量印刷，而且由10年期以上的T-Bond和同年期的TIPS息差來看，市場預期通漲不斷惡化。就算以2年期到5年期的T-Note的孳息走勢來看，市場對美元的興趣也有減少。但是，以4個星期，3個月和6個月的短期T-bill來看，卻依然有相當需求，這固然因為資本市場不穩定，但是也因為其他主要貨幣，除人民幣外，比美元更不濟，市場所以短期內尚未放棄美元，亦成為黃金作為後備貨幣的角色的主要競爭對手，結果是黃金作為避險的角色成為主要。
不過，雖然黃金現時作為資本市場的避險角色是最重要，但是也不能完全就和資本市場玩相反方向即可。由於黃金有了一直上升的總需求，成交這幾年越來越活躍，所以炒賣的情況一樣劇烈，因此如果美元流通充足(而不是吸入資產負債表的量遠高於流出市面的量) ，而現在對未來的估計又個個不同，絕對有可能同時炒股債金，造成股金或金債之間的相反關係短暫脫勾。
在現時市場的期望和對後市的分析如此模糊的情況下，各技術分析的工具未必能對市場下一步作出較有意義的估計，不過如果即期，下期如果分析及以後的期金和期金期貨的情形，留意最多未平倉合約的價位，或許能對後市有個概念。詳情請參參小弟的blog的舊post(應該在二月份或一月份的) 。
現時儘管美元被大量印刷，而且由10年期以上的T-Bond和同年期的TIPS息差來看，市場預期通漲不斷惡化。就算以2年期到5年期的T-Note的孳息走勢來看，市場對美元的興趣也有減少。但是，以4個星期，3個月和6個月的短期T-bill來看，卻依然有相當需求，這固然因為資本市場不穩定，但是也因為其他主要貨幣，除人民幣外，比美元更不濟，市場所以短期內尚未放棄美元，亦成為黃金作為後備貨幣的角色的主要競爭對手，結果是黃金作為避險的角色成為主要。
不過，雖然黃金現時作為資本市場的避險角色是最重要，但是也不能完全就和資本市場玩相反方向即可。由於黃金有了一直上升的總需求，成交這幾年越來越活躍，所以炒賣的情況一樣劇烈，因此如果美元流通充足(而不是吸入資產負債表的量遠高於流出市面的量) ，而現在對未來的估計又個個不同，絕對有可能同時炒股債金，造成股金或金債之間的相反關係短暫脫勾。
在現時市場的期望和對後市的分析如此模糊的情況下，各技術分析的工具未必能對市場下一步作出較有意義的估計，不過如果即期，下期如果分析及以後的期金和期金期貨的情形，留意最多未平倉合約的價位，或許能對後市有個概念。詳情請參參小弟的blog的舊post(應該在二月份或一月份的) 。
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
關於匯豐
供，不供；買，不買；賣，不賣；這些都是極為個人的決定。這沒有標準答案。可是，有些因素卻不可不察的。
首先要問自己，買匯豐的目的是賺大比數無限制升幅（即止蝕唔止賺），還是賺至目標升幅即離場？
如果是前者，有兩個問題問自己：為什麼預期有大比數無限制升幅？是因為環景好，行業好，公司好這些基本因素，還是純粹是極度超賣？
聰明的壇友一定能看得出，“極度超賣” 其實是一個偽命題：哪有“極度超賣” 是可以預期有大比數無限制升幅？極度超賣看的是技術層面：當股票短期內極度超賣，市場自然有人入市去搏反彈或者真正回升。但是，到底何者才是最終結果，就要回看基本因素。以匯豐而言，經營環景只有ok與差甚至極差的分別—縱使較不受影響的亞太地區，亦必定會面對激烈的競爭，尤其是國有銀行。行業方面就更不用說，既是海嘯源頭，而且到現在為止還未看到資產貶值潮的結束，能好得了哪裡？至於匯控本身問題多多；單是股東內鬥已經可以” 玩殘” 股價，更不用說其現金外流，資本不足，以及歐美業務尾大不掉的老問題了。最可怕的是，到現在為止，尚未見到匯控管理層悔過並改革—當然，19號艾力” 騎士” 會否逼匯控高層下台，又是否成功，是另外一個故事，現略去不提。
這樣一來，玩匯豐的原因，無非就是技術性超賣，即價格問題，而不是價值問題。
接下來的問題很清晰：以什麼價賣？如何去定？這個價格能出到貨嗎？
這是大難題！為什麼？” 人人言殊” 。
單是計價方法都好幾款，更惶論每個人對” 賺幾多先夠” 都感覺不同。在現時人心惶惶，大戶又操上操落，訊息極度混亂，前景又不明朗的情況下，市價往往”冇譜” ，變化又很急遽，試問要想賺盡就走，談何容易？要猜大戶想怎樣，就算猜中，落過場的都知道，隨時可以有價無市，那就極為” 冇癮” 了。
所以，想玩十八摸，就要衡量自己的功夫夠不夠，紀律性夠不夠，一達到目標價就不理會後市是否再狂飆都要離場，一旦到止蝕位就不管有冇機會反彈都止蝕沽出，而且要有點市場觸角：不然你訂下目標價是一個月內70元，則實現的機會有多大？另外，再抽離點看，如同Rightsider兄，羅兄，竹本兄，和其他壇友都指出過：機會成本的問題。要達到同樣的賺錢，是否非要買匯控不可？竹本兄早前透露過不少可賺的股份，西門兄又做過專題討論，這些都比只看匯控更有意思。至於Rightsider兄，VicktorCapitalist兄，羅兄，小弟和很多壇友亦論及黃金，外匯，和債卷這些工具。既然有如此多的選擇，為什麼不多討論這些選擇？
首先要問自己，買匯豐的目的是賺大比數無限制升幅（即止蝕唔止賺），還是賺至目標升幅即離場？
如果是前者，有兩個問題問自己：為什麼預期有大比數無限制升幅？是因為環景好，行業好，公司好這些基本因素，還是純粹是極度超賣？
聰明的壇友一定能看得出，“極度超賣” 其實是一個偽命題：哪有“極度超賣” 是可以預期有大比數無限制升幅？極度超賣看的是技術層面：當股票短期內極度超賣，市場自然有人入市去搏反彈或者真正回升。但是，到底何者才是最終結果，就要回看基本因素。以匯豐而言，經營環景只有ok與差甚至極差的分別—縱使較不受影響的亞太地區，亦必定會面對激烈的競爭，尤其是國有銀行。行業方面就更不用說，既是海嘯源頭，而且到現在為止還未看到資產貶值潮的結束，能好得了哪裡？至於匯控本身問題多多；單是股東內鬥已經可以” 玩殘” 股價，更不用說其現金外流，資本不足，以及歐美業務尾大不掉的老問題了。最可怕的是，到現在為止，尚未見到匯控管理層悔過並改革—當然，19號艾力” 騎士” 會否逼匯控高層下台，又是否成功，是另外一個故事，現略去不提。
這樣一來，玩匯豐的原因，無非就是技術性超賣，即價格問題，而不是價值問題。
接下來的問題很清晰：以什麼價賣？如何去定？這個價格能出到貨嗎？
這是大難題！為什麼？” 人人言殊” 。
單是計價方法都好幾款，更惶論每個人對” 賺幾多先夠” 都感覺不同。在現時人心惶惶，大戶又操上操落，訊息極度混亂，前景又不明朗的情況下，市價往往”冇譜” ，變化又很急遽，試問要想賺盡就走，談何容易？要猜大戶想怎樣，就算猜中，落過場的都知道，隨時可以有價無市，那就極為” 冇癮” 了。
所以，想玩十八摸，就要衡量自己的功夫夠不夠，紀律性夠不夠，一達到目標價就不理會後市是否再狂飆都要離場，一旦到止蝕位就不管有冇機會反彈都止蝕沽出，而且要有點市場觸角：不然你訂下目標價是一個月內70元，則實現的機會有多大？另外，再抽離點看，如同Rightsider兄，羅兄，竹本兄，和其他壇友都指出過：機會成本的問題。要達到同樣的賺錢，是否非要買匯控不可？竹本兄早前透露過不少可賺的股份，西門兄又做過專題討論，這些都比只看匯控更有意思。至於Rightsider兄，VicktorCapitalist兄，羅兄，小弟和很多壇友亦論及黃金，外匯，和債卷這些工具。既然有如此多的選擇，為什麼不多討論這些選擇？
Sunday, March 8, 2009
華潤創業
Let me initiate some discussions first. I have not done detailed studies on it so my opinion is only preliminary.
According to the 2008 interium report:
Gross Margin is about 24.5%,
Profit Margin is about 5.4%,
ROE is 5.16%,
ROA is 2.53%,
Quick Ratio is 0.83%,
Current Ratio is 1.086%,
Debt/Equity Ratio is 0.27%.
From credit side, it does not have sttrong burden on debt and low interest expense. The survival of the group will not be a big problem. Its discrepency bewtween current and quick ratios tell that the cash cycle may be slow despite it is in a cash-based business. In other words, its efficiency of selling still requires improvement.
It also reflects that the selling expenses take a heavy part despite the cost of goods sold. Considering the 3 breweries it will aquire only have utilization of production capacity of 50% or lower, China Resources may not achieve the planned synergy profit had it not improved its selling efficiency.
The low ROE and ROA are the characteristics of basic food and drinks retails. Yet, the P/E of the purchase price, 11.12, with a projected EPS as 0.62 * 2(for whole year) = 1.24, will be 8.96. If we inverse the ratio, it will be 0.1115. Assume the market price of stock only represent the value of equity, at this P/E we expect a ROE of 11.15%, while the actual ROE is only 5.16%, a discount of 54%. From this point of view, the stock may be over-priced for the moment. Nevertheless, under the current situation, China Resources's business may provide a good capital shelter. Had it focused on improving sales efficiency, it would have strong potential to further develop.
My humble 2 cents.
According to the 2008 interium report:
Gross Margin is about 24.5%,
Profit Margin is about 5.4%,
ROE is 5.16%,
ROA is 2.53%,
Quick Ratio is 0.83%,
Current Ratio is 1.086%,
Debt/Equity Ratio is 0.27%.
From credit side, it does not have sttrong burden on debt and low interest expense. The survival of the group will not be a big problem. Its discrepency bewtween current and quick ratios tell that the cash cycle may be slow despite it is in a cash-based business. In other words, its efficiency of selling still requires improvement.
It also reflects that the selling expenses take a heavy part despite the cost of goods sold. Considering the 3 breweries it will aquire only have utilization of production capacity of 50% or lower, China Resources may not achieve the planned synergy profit had it not improved its selling efficiency.
The low ROE and ROA are the characteristics of basic food and drinks retails. Yet, the P/E of the purchase price, 11.12, with a projected EPS as 0.62 * 2(for whole year) = 1.24, will be 8.96. If we inverse the ratio, it will be 0.1115. Assume the market price of stock only represent the value of equity, at this P/E we expect a ROE of 11.15%, while the actual ROE is only 5.16%, a discount of 54%. From this point of view, the stock may be over-priced for the moment. Nevertheless, under the current situation, China Resources's business may provide a good capital shelter. Had it focused on improving sales efficiency, it would have strong potential to further develop.
My humble 2 cents.
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
Pro HSBC: Corporate Bond Yield and AAA Banking and Finance Rate Rise
While we focus on HSBC, other figures may signal another wave of problems:
Meanwhile, mortgage rate in USA has still been stable and not subjected to large fluctuation.
Gold price is 926.70USD/ounce; Brent oil is 43.65USD/barrel. The former one has been dropping while the latter one is stablizing and even rising a bit.
From the figures above, the risk of corporate bankrupcy or under the risk of bankrupcy has been increasing. Another horrible phenomenon is that the traditional safe havens, bonds and gold, both have their prices decreased. Considering the re-tightening of credits and available capital and even potential issuance of rights by banks and corporates due to adverse result announcement (and expectation by the market about bankrupcy or at least heavy debt), the available fund in the market will be sucked to the "black holes" due to massive write-off. It also hints that another wave of not only stock market drops but may also be all market drop (and even further job cut) are coming. Seat tight, fasten your seat belt, and prepare!
- Corporate Bond Yield, investment grade average = 7.38%, already up from 6.xx last month.
- 5-year AAA banking and finance rate = 5.91% up from 4.96% 1 month prior.
- 10-year AAA banking and finance rate = 6.76% up from 5.77% 1 month prior.
- 3-month TED rises to 1% after a month of contraction; 1-month UST even rose to 0.51%.
- While short-term UST price remains stable, long-term UST price has been dropping. UK, Germany, Australia, and Brazil all follow the same trend. (another hint about HSBC: except China and HK, most of its other major markets are suffering from confidence problems).
- CDS index of USD has been increasing to 170pts on average. The trend has been picking up on all sectors.
Meanwhile, mortgage rate in USA has still been stable and not subjected to large fluctuation.
Gold price is 926.70USD/ounce; Brent oil is 43.65USD/barrel. The former one has been dropping while the latter one is stablizing and even rising a bit.
From the figures above, the risk of corporate bankrupcy or under the risk of bankrupcy has been increasing. Another horrible phenomenon is that the traditional safe havens, bonds and gold, both have their prices decreased. Considering the re-tightening of credits and available capital and even potential issuance of rights by banks and corporates due to adverse result announcement (and expectation by the market about bankrupcy or at least heavy debt), the available fund in the market will be sucked to the "black holes" due to massive write-off. It also hints that another wave of not only stock market drops but may also be all market drop (and even further job cut) are coming. Seat tight, fasten your seat belt, and prepare!
Sunday, March 1, 2009
A Property in Shanghai - Inspirations
On the Saturaday I went to an open-house in the Zhong-shan Park in Chang-ling area of Shanghai City. The developer is 麗新. Offical mortgage provider is Hang Seng Bank (China).
There is a big gardern at the middle of the complex with the full-facility club house. Underground parkade is located under the garden and each parking space is sold separately from the suite. Surroundings are a famous gigantic shopping mall with 3 subway lines intersected. Office towers (one of which locates Accenture's Shanghai office) are in walking distance. Yet by heritage this area was used to be a mid-low class residential area only.
6 Blocks were all sold and fully occupied on phase 1 around 2007-Oct. 3 blocks of Phase 2 has been on sale ever since 2008-April.
The units on sold are of the sizes 100sqm and 145sqm. By the drawings provided and actual inspection, the utilization rates (excluding even the balcony) are 78% and 84% respectively.
The indicative price are as follows:
1. Floor 1-5: RMB25,000/sqm
2. Floor 5-10: RMB25,000-27,000/sqm
3. Floor 10-25: RMB27,000-29,000/sqm
4. Floor 25 up: RMB29,000-32,000/sqm
I have checked the rental prices of similar suites in the surroundings. For apartment unit of an area around 140sqm at the middle high storey, the rental will be 12000RMB/month (tax included). It is about 86RMB/sqm/month. Therefore, rental return is about 86x12/28000 = 3.68% only.
There is a big gardern at the middle of the complex with the full-facility club house. Underground parkade is located under the garden and each parking space is sold separately from the suite. Surroundings are a famous gigantic shopping mall with 3 subway lines intersected. Office towers (one of which locates Accenture's Shanghai office) are in walking distance. Yet by heritage this area was used to be a mid-low class residential area only.
6 Blocks were all sold and fully occupied on phase 1 around 2007-Oct. 3 blocks of Phase 2 has been on sale ever since 2008-April.
The units on sold are of the sizes 100sqm and 145sqm. By the drawings provided and actual inspection, the utilization rates (excluding even the balcony) are 78% and 84% respectively.
The indicative price are as follows:
1. Floor 1-5: RMB25,000/sqm
2. Floor 5-10: RMB25,000-27,000/sqm
3. Floor 10-25: RMB27,000-29,000/sqm
4. Floor 25 up: RMB29,000-32,000/sqm
I have checked the rental prices of similar suites in the surroundings. For apartment unit of an area around 140sqm at the middle high storey, the rental will be 12000RMB/month (tax included). It is about 86RMB/sqm/month. Therefore, rental return is about 86x12/28000 = 3.68% only.
While in recent time the Shanghai property in the same area should have decreased by 10-15% according to the statistics, there are new properties, like this one, have their price level stayed high and rigid. Is there any reason behind it?
Let me do a wild guess.
This apartment's phase 2 started selling on 2008-April, and phase 1 started half a year earlier which was on 2007-Nov. Usually it took 1.5-2 years to complete the construction of the complex. Therefore, construction should start around 2005 Nov to 2006-May. By practice it will take 1-1.5 year to complete the feasibility studies to land bidding and mobilization process. Hence, the land should be bought around the period of 2004 May - 2005 May. During that period, the land at that area should be priced around RMB6,000-8,000/sqm. Construction cost is RMB3,000/sqm, including interior decoration. Assume another RMB1,000/sqm for general administration and promotion, then the total cost, per land base, is RMB10,000 - 12,000/sqm.
Simply by the utilization rate of 78 - 83%, the actual selling price for the available-to-sell area can be around RMB14,400 - 15,400/sqm. Now, by the time they sold the units, the average price of such complex in such area has already escalated to RMB29,000-33,000/sqm. Thus, the units should have generated a profit margin of 88.3% - 129%.
With reference to the developer, the occupency rate is 100% of phase 1, 15% of phase 2. Thus the total occupency rate of the entire complex (as phase 1 is equal to phase 2), will be 50% + 7.5% = 57.5%. Assume the developer has exaggerated by 20%; an actual occupency rate of 46% is recorded. Therefore the actual profit margin is in the range of -13.3% - 5.4% based on the selling price for the available-to-sell area. If we calculate in the actual cost being distributed on every bit of the area, the profit margin is in the range of 11.1% - 51.8%.
On the other hand, recently the transaction volume is low, and the anchorage price has not dropped since 2008. The insufficient transaction will allow the developers which have sufficient cash in hand to continue a high-price policy without risking of losing market shares. Also, the low volume of selling, amidst a worsening environment, cannot be altered with a lower price (since the interest of purchase depends not on the price but on the willingness of the potential buyers).
From the little analysis shown above, the motivation for the developer to lower the price is not sufficient. The marginal profit gained by lowering price for larger volume is not sufficient to cover the marginal cost. Furthermore, the developer, just by the previous sales, has already earnt sufficient profit (to please the investors) and cash flow to sustain further operations. For developers with similar financial strength, most of which are from Hong Kong, may be able to hold off for a longer period and even make bigger profits during recovery.
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