擬似"牛一"不足信

以美國的各種貸款息率的形勢看來，危機尚未過去。而且，由成品鐵價暴跌和BDI打回05年左右的水平來看，2009年的上半年經濟活動都會大幅減少，這都會大大減低公司的盈利；對於擴張過度的公司更會有虧損甚至倒閉。失業人數和被凍薪的人仕肯定繼續增加；消費繼續不振，而中國的出口則繼續疲弱。

當然，各國央行會大力印銀紙和開工程去谷起經濟活動。縱使真的成功，銀行填好黑洞起碼要過埋08季尾做年結和09第一季才可以"做好盤數"—想做數，光做2008年是不夠的，必須要借用2009第一季方可"乾坤大挪移"。

至於各大白象工程開展；美國肯定要到09年新總統上任才開始討論。就算100日內通過，但是再加上計劃和招標，起碼都要有另外180日時間，然後再加上由中標到開工又需要最少60日的時間，開工後最快30日公司和員工才有糧出。公司項目要打和，以一年的工程，毛利50%，純利15%計算，要9個月約270日。這樣計算的話，少說也要(100+180+60+30+270)=640日即一年零九個月的時間政府送去企業的錢才起效。就算以個人重新有人工就立即加大消費都是370日後的事，再加上55日後才在第一季業積反映，也是425日後即2010第一季的事。縱使股市行先經濟半年，也是2009第三季的事。或許中國能加快工程開展的時間，說什麼也要半年的時間才上馬。而且縱然中國國民能增加消費，最多也是令國內產品增銷，對外國的入口產品改善有限。在這種形勢下，最多是保八、即約2004-2005年間的擴張規模。要回到2006-2007的火紅火綠，則恐怕要全球經濟復甦才成。香港既然深受此兩者的影響，要重新好景恐怕都是三季後的事了。

FED Pumps Money; How Long can these Money Last?

From the week of Oct 13 - Oct 20, FED has dumped a total worth of (43.6+54.3) = 97.9b USD to the market. At the same period, up to now the LIBOR-FED rate spreads have decreased from 309pts and 332pts (on Oct 13) for 1 month and 3 month respectively to 185pts and 219pts respectively. Temporarily the liquidity of banks and hence corporates can restore.


However, the longer term loan rates have climbed from 6.25% (5 year) and 7.50% (10 year) on Oct 13 to 7.39% (5 year) and 8.83% (10 year) on Oct 31; only by the interest cut on Oct 30 the longer term loan have mildly decreased to 7.32% and 8.79% respectively. But, comparing with the same rate 1 year prior (when the sub-prime has emerged but the market is still positive about soft-landing), at 5.11% and 5.16% respectively (and FED Target rate is 4.75% at that time; risk premium is only a mere 36pts and 91pts respectively), the mild drop is insignificant at all. Corporate will still face hardship on raising fund for longer-term projects. Only money for immediate survival is available.


Mortgage Rates have not changed from Oct 30 and remained at high point. Auto Loans also increased by 2 basis pts on average. Now 36 month new car loan is 6.84%, 48 month new car loan is 6.60%, 60 month new car loan is 6.62%, and 72 month car loan is 6.44%. In other words, the loan rates for consumption remains at high.


The only bizzare response is on DJI which makes significant rebound after the injection of 97.9b USD to the market. Yet, the rebound is only back to 9180.69 from 8451.19, by 8.63% only. Comparing with the closing at 2008 first trading date, 13043.96, the discount is still at 42.08%. Even if the FED continues to flood money at the same rate, to restore to the same level, even just by proportion method another 476b USD is needed. It has not included the already existing 700b USD offering by goverment on any single institution for bailing out.


Thus, the rebound effect due to the money pumping perhaps is only a short-term one. In longer term, recession is perhaps still unaviodable.

適得其反：減息只能令市場嫖客化…

現在減息一如嫖客吃偉哥，越吃越要多吃才有效果，不能自拔。

現在有數點可以肯定：
1. 還會繼續減息，
2. 樓市還會下跌，
3. 消費持續減少，
4. 公司經營困難，
5. 銀行增加資本。

這樣一來，幾乎可以估計到銀行會怎樣反應了：
1. 減息後向財政部買錢，但適可而止—充足資本比和夠營運即可，
2. 買來的錢去買短期的國庫債卷，在下次減息前後債券價格上升時再賣出，然後買進下一輪的債券。時間把握得好再加點運，分分鐘可以執到錯價貨。
3. 拉高其餘借貸息率，減低風險。

在這種情況，美國政府注入的資金結果又回到了美國政府去，市場上貨幣短缺。如果懂得把玩銀行出入錢的時刻，則或許可以做美匯兌其他貨幣的長短倉賺錢。甚至對於商品價格亦有參考作用。

對後市的小小估計

以下是在信報的回應：

"羅兄，"行家"二字小弟可不敢當。我的意見不就很明顯嗎：

1. 在樓市尚未喘定(利率下降但房貸息率上升；息差上升)，

2. 銀行不願放貸(利率下降但長債息率上升；息差上升；政府債券孳息下降—銀行寧可買債券都不放數)，

3. 企業盈利下降甚至倒閉(長債息率、息差上升；公司債券孳息上升；資產貶值；公司難以進行大發展；項目減少；人手減少)，

4. 消費減少(失業上升；工資下降；可抵押資產貶值甚至負債)，

5. 工業製品和原材料需求下降，炒作資金亦短缺(CRB和BDI崩盤)，

6. 政府稅收下降，開支卻增加，令債務增加(貨幣供應增加引致貶值)，

7. 資金離開資產市場，再加上消費下跌，引發新一輪的資產跌價潮。

8. 如此直至平衡點到達或者其他因素改變。"

記得要看長息…

昨夜道指大反彈，連商品都上多少，同時LIBOR回落少少，容易令人頭腦發熱。

值得注意的是3A Banking Rate卻和LIBOR背馳上升：5年期已至7.25%；10年期升至8.74%。此外，長期定息房貸息率已經逼近上次減息前的高位：30年期的相差才7個點子；15年期的更已經高過減息前的高位做5.94% (P+1.44)。銀行仍在調高房地產市場的風險溢價。而該市場一日未穩定下來，一日都未可以說到底。

另外，消費信心指數居然跌到得38，和上月的59.8相比，足足跌了46%，就算把過度恐慌的情緒也計算在內，跌幅依然驚人。就算由2008年1月份的87.9跌至6月份的50.4(38點之前的低位)，6個月才跌了43%，可見現時人心有多麼的虛怯。消費不前，公司利潤大幅減少；長期發展的資本又不足，所有的因素都大大影響公司未來的盈利能力。這樣一來，到年底時又將會發現現在的P/E和P/B原來還不算便宜—畢竟EPS是可以負數的也。

當然，有人會認為現時股價已反映(甚至過度反映)對未來的期望。關於這一點，借用曹sir的口頭禪"木宰羊"。可是，如果環境真的那麼好，在沒有通脹的情況下，為什麼銀行的長期借貸和房貸的息率還是只升不跌？

Problems with Gold: Why not Rise?

Traditionally, whenever most of the world currencies face the creditential problems, or whenever the money supplies surges and drives hyper-inflation, gold should be the ideal haven. However, it seems not the case now. Why?

The blind spots of the above position are:

1. It ignored the credit crunch is caused by the burst of property and finance market bubble and hence the massive write-off of asset value. In another sense, it also means the "evaporation" of "money on the book". Thus, money supply is not "excessive" in the market.

2. It ignored the fact that new money supply from FED and central government has not flown to the market, as shown by first LIBOR and now AAA finance and Mortgage Rates. Instead, the lowering of bond yields and the surging JPY and USD show that the money supplied to the bank has returned to the supplier through sales of overseas asset and then purchases of government bonds, particularly US government bond.

3. It ignored the fact that Gold has already hitted new high previously, at the time before credit crunches has become serious. When the risk of inflation drops, the function of gold as hedging against USD has weakened.

4. It ignored the fact that there were speculations on gold market previously, and that the gold futures market has grown 10 times larger (or even above) than the spot market, a hint of speculation over actual demand. With the credit crunch and tightening of new loan, speculators can no longer continue to play at large.

5. It ignored the implausible return of Gold Standard. The nominal World GDP on 2007, in USD, is 54.62 trillion. Meanwhile, the total mined gold weighed about 30,000tonnes. If we use Gold Standard and keep the existing capital reserve ratio at 8% (and hence the same money muliplier) and that the gold mining rate can keep up with the multiplier, then at current price of gold at 730USD/ounce, our gold reserve can only support a size of world economy at nominal GDP of about 9.64trillion USD, only 18% of the current economic activities. Besides, by Gold Standard, the world economy growth is controlled by the demand and supply of gold (and silver) but not by the demand and supply of human consumption and productivity.

Nevertheless, it does not mean that gold price will simply plummet back to before Iraqi War level. It only means that gold price may be up and down with a narrow band-width and a bottom price at 600USD/ounce. If eventually Keynesian economy takes place in the world successfully, a long position for gold may be viable in longer term.

New Home Sales in US vs Mortgage Rate

The so-called improvement on new home sales on september in US is vague: it is better than "consensus" value. But people overlook that the trend is still at the down side.


On the other hand, mortgage rates rising has started to pick up momentum again after the tiny drop last week. The worst is that despite the money injection and improvement on short-term liquidity availability, as shown on LIBOR easing, the long-term borrowing rates are rising. 5-year and 10-year AAA banking and finance rates reached 7.06% and 8.55% respectively.


Under such rates, enterprises can no longer afford any new developments requiring finance from outside. Anticipated profits will be lowered in alignment to the lowering of economic activities. It will further push down the equity market, and in turn worsen enterprises' liability position. Chain reaction will continue until the situation settles.

Attention...

Several periods are to be noticed:

New Year: the release of Q4 result. For financial, high-end consumer goods, construction (and related machinery), transportation, raw materials, automobiles, and oil industry, ask for God's mercy.

Chinese New Year: lay-off wave.

March and April 2009: release of 2008 annual result. Again, for the above mentioned industries, unless for the highly conservative corporates, otherwise, again, pray.

Exceptional Movement on Rates

LIBOR is down but the crisis is far from over.
5 Year and 10 Year banking and finance rate, after the continuous drop from last Monday, has increased to the new high 7.03% and 8.31% respectively on Friday, following the plummet of US stock market.

Apparently the market is worrying about both the profitability and solvency issues of the corporates. With an expected huge retreat on corporate profits, the operating cash flow that can at least pay off the cost of working capital will be greatly decreased. The potential enormous write-off and impairment on short-term investment and hedging is already no news. Even if LIBOR is decreased enough for corporates to survive today, their abilities to deal with their loans and losses, and hence their longer term of survival, are highly questioned by the market. Any banks, in trouble or not, will no longer provide windows for corporates to re-finance, or even finance potential long term projects. The increase on AAA banking and finance rate, plus the high corporate bond coupon rate at 10% by giants like GE and Caterpillar, are proofs to the above observation.

Under huge credit pressure, plus the plummet of commodity markets, a traditional hedging tool of USD inflation, further dries up the pool of current asset of the corporate, and drives them to sell as much of these asset as possible to stop loss, polish their balance sheets, and preserve cash to fund the projects/operation of the coming year, under the assumption that no new line of credit will be available.

The collapse of these markets will also induce the collapse of the high-yield commodity currency. USD's strength against these currencies is a proof. The drops on the T-bill yield is another. Besides, the spread between yield and target rate keeps narrowing, another hint on the closed-money-loop: money loant by FED to banks will simply go back to FED via t-bills, at the absence of other low risk investment tool.

Combining the above observations together, it is too early to say the market has already reached bottom. The new figures and saving measures showing up on the coming weeks may ease the pressure by little; nevertheless, as long as Main Street and Wall Street as well as property market are still dropping, and the black holes of the corporates have not been filled up, all the measures by FED are only pain-killers with its potency shrinking unstoppedly.

Updates

Short-term credit crisis has relaxed as shown on LIBOR spreads: 203pts and 233pts for 1 month and 3 month respectively. Nevertheless, the spreads of AAA finance still stand high: 483pts and 603pts respectively for 5-yr and 10-yr. Risks on longer-term loans for F.I. and corporates are still rated HIGH.

Mortgage, as expected, is no better off. Relaxation by not more than 20pts are nothing significant comparing to 100pts less (than now) on the same rates at 6 months prior.

M2 supplies is negative on the 2nd week of October. While the government has made various bailout plans, the money supplies can go nowhere but on the balance sheets of banks and on government bonds (overseas investors). Same trend continues; liquidity trap can be observed.

With such pattern, plus the rally of USD, still tells us that despite the gone of immediate credit collapse the shrinkling and de-leveraging of the economy is still substantial and continuous.

The market will see the first real bottom around the time the announcement of annual results of various companies. Although market has expected the "worst", it is only an expected estimation. What actually happened is not known, but at the very least, we can expect consumer goods, unless those cheap daily ones, will drop in sales. Following the entire value chain, one will see the dealers and manufacturers are in even deeper troubles. After last year, the golden age of commodities has temporarily gone. Raw material producers, many of whom have had stockpiled doubled or even tripled for last few years will swallow the bitter fruit they pow.

通脹、通縮，均非定數

通脹，還是通縮，這是個問題。

問題的核心，還看政府和薪金的關係。

就算金融的黑洞被填好，如果市場在重重監管下無法自由地投資到較高回報的項目或因為太多規條而令新企業缺乏較抵玩的資金去拓展業務，再加上貿易保護令本土市場缺乏競爭和選擇，則政府平賣予銀行的資本卻會由銀行和普羅大眾購買國債之行為"回饋"。尤其在人口老化的地區區，一眾原本可安享晚年現在卻大損其老本的退休人仕肯定會對風險極為忌諱，寧可收"可耻的利息"也不願投放在任何有較高風險卻也有較高回報的項目上。已到了收成期，原本手頭鬆的有銀仕尚且如此；一眾尚有家庭負擔並拼摶中的中堅份子更不會"亂咁來"。至於國債的本源卻依然是財政部的墨水(和稅收)。再者，企業缺乏擴張，人工無法上調，賤物鬥窮人的情形就會出現。本來印銀紙是導致通脹的，可是在投資和消費意慾極低的情況下，泛濫的信貸卻進不了國內的市場，形成國內通縮(但是國外卻可以通脹)的奇象。

可是，要是政府在救金融系統的同時，直接通過各政府直接投資的項目，再加上各種變相補貼和行業及貿易保護以減少國外競爭甚至人為抬高工資和福利，並借各種手段減低全球化外判的可能性，使到資金追遂人工上漲，則惡性通脹重臨絕非奇譚。

由現時各國的手段來看，重心還是先放在恢復金融體系的信用和正常營運上，在輔以一定程度的公共開支去刺激經濟，至於高度的貿易保護卻未見抬頭。在工資和資金沒有互相追遂，消費和投資都低迷的情況下，發生通縮似乎更有可能。

可是，這次因為是用國有化的點子去救市，對日後的經濟發展留下變數。一旦經濟情況在數年間難有起色，在民粹派和工會/左翼份子的夾擊下，屆時政府可能用國有化，高福利和貿易保護去解決問題。如是者潘朶拉的箱子被打開，惡性通脹這頭猛獸將重臨！

The above article is also posted in Hong Kong Economic Journal's forum at
http://www.hkej.com/template/forum/php/forum_details.php?blog_posts_id=4330

Premier Wan's 10 Economy Saving Measures...

溫拾招
國家統計局公布內地第三季經濟數據前夕，總理溫家寶上周五(17日)召開國務院常務會議，提出「靈活審慎的宏觀經濟政策」，包括：
1.加大對農民農村優惠力度
2.鼓勵金融機構增加對中小企貸款
3.提高服裝、紡織、機電產品出口退稅率
4.加大投資、保持合理投資規模
5.繼續控制物價上漲
6.推進節能減排，嚴控環保監控
7.加強稅收徵管，嚴控支出
8.加強金融監管，防範金融風險
9.做好食品安全和安全生產工作
10.解決涉及民生的問題，加大保障性住房建設規模，降低住房交易稅費，支持居民購房

新華社引述會議稱，「國際經濟環境中不穩定因素明顯增多，對中國的影響逐步顯現，國內經濟運行中出現了一些新情況、新問題。主要是經濟增長放緩趨勢明顯，企業利潤和財政收入增速下降，資本市場持續波動和低迷」，並重申結束的中共三中全會提出了「堅定信心，冷靜觀察，多管齊下，有效應對」的16字方針。會議還提出「加大保障性住房建設規模，降低住房交易稅，支持居民購房」。所謂保障性住房，即針對中低收入建造的經濟適用房和廉租房。

據統計，北京、上海等內地13個大城市今年計劃新建保障性住房面積共4894萬平方米，佔新建住房面積比例為27.8%。全國大部分城市保障性住房面積佔新建住房面積的比例都在10%以上。有分析認為，由於保障性住房在內地城市房市中亦佔有一定比例，會議提出「支持居民購房」，對樓市也會有一定的刺激作用。

The above announcement is interesting.

The first 3 target on the plummeted farmers and SME in manufacturing and export sectors. However, the first measure will be encountered and even offset by 9 due to the markt structure: small individual farmers, with insufficient subsidies, comprised of the main force and hence are incompetitive in the highly commiditized farming products market. Without sufficient incentive, farmers are either continuing to cheap chemcials to replace natural products or selling their lands to real-estate/manufacturing sector, which in turn will be in conflict with measure 6.

Measure 6 and 7 will again counteract measure 2 and 3. Entrepreuners who have invested in China understand how complicated and heavy and unfair the tax is. The source is the central goverment that wants to save as much money as possible in their own accounts and wants to benefit the state-owned enterprises as much as possible. Besides, environmental regulations are known as a tool of asking money from the enterprises by the municipal and county governments. But, the most important point is: with the declining OECD markets, measure 2 and 3 can only be bandages. The previous tightening on 6 and 7 has already resulted in waves of bankrupcy of manufacturers. It is already too late to start on preserving them (as many of them had cut too deep already).

Measure 10 just walks on the previous steps of US government. And it is apparent that it is against measure 5. If measure 10 is successful, measure 5 is not, and vice versa.

Now, the noticable part is 4: what will the central government do? How much will they invest? Are these investment are for job creations only, or can really improve competitiveness of China? And can with these investment government can improve the supplies side efficiency and hence control 5? Lets pay attention to the forecoming details.

Inflation or Deflation?

By definition, the money supply decides inflation or deflation. CPI is NOT the index of inflation. It has been proven in the last few years: while US was expanding on credits, it benefited from the cheap production cost from China. Yet it was reflected on commodity price.

The current policy makers, in order to avoid liquidity trap as shown on Japan, have supplied money to the intermediates (banks and financial institutions) to encourage loans. Yet, without reliable and highly potential projects, bankers invest on nowhere. Besides, as the borrowing cost is low, it does not matter for them to re-invest back to the government for a low yield rate.

The control of banks by government may alter the appetite of bankers by orders.

Meanwhile government needs to "create" beneficiary of the "mandatory loans". Government projects will be one of the obvious most ways; subsidies from government on "coporate participants" for creating projects and jobs will be another.

Depending on the strength of will of maintaining a certain level of salary by labour through their representatives as well as the economic conditions, the degree of divergence of salary from actual labour market determines the stickiness of salary - the essence of Keynesian school. Government will be easily tempted to please their electors by altering the actual demand and supply on labour market.

If that appears, inflation will also come back.

Possible scenario, then, will be: first deflation due to credit crunch; then hyper-inflation due to un-disciplined government spending. But if the government refuses to directly spend money and level up labour salary, deflation continues and will also harm the global economy completely.

Can this "rebound" in HSI last?

Hong Kong market is an open market that couples with China and US market. The so-called fundamentals in Hong Kong are comprised of property, banking and finance, and China concepts. None of these sectors are sound under the anticipated decline on economy. As eventually equity market will follow the economy and not the vice versa, the "rebound" in HSI in recent 2 days cannot last long.

An update on US credit crisis:

Risk Premium (according to figures posted on Bloomberg):

1-month LIBOR: 297 pts (dropped)

3-month LIBOR: 314 pts (dropped)

5-year AAA: 531 pts (risen!)

10-year AAA: 651 pts (risen!!!; now 8.01%!!!)

This is a notable phenomenon: LIBOR drops; AAA finance rate still rises. The bailout only benefits the bank yet the bank does not pass it out to grade AAA financial institutions. Without continuous support, selling of asset will continue. Companies that rely solely on banks may stop worsening on liquidity issue as bank will loan. But, companies that also include institutional investors will find their shares in the market at a low price - even not as bad as last week. Divestment still rolls on. We cannot expect much on the coming market.

An alternate explanation is that banks KNOW their AAA counterparts are in deep holes. These AAA counterparts do not have the muscles to climb out. Under a starving condition, why bother throw a pill of supplement while bank themselves cannot have their crave fulfilled? And afterall, this pill of supplement can only provide vitamins but not calores.

Actually, there can even be a third interpretation: AAA is anything; AAA is nothing. The rather arbitrary announcement of upgrading and downgrading, particularly AFTER corporate quarterly result announcement, inevitably raises our question: what are you guys, S&P, Moody, etc, doing? You do not warn ahead but after? And a grading from AAA to AA+ or even just AA can be changed in ONE NIGHT? This is a REAL CREDIT CRUNCH: not on figures but on TRUST.

Mortgage rates do not change. Yes, no rise; NO DROP.

If we look at the bond yield, they all rise. However, interestingly the prices for bond below 2-year also rose - the reverse of the trend of last Friday. While bond yield rise should mean an outflow of money from bond market to elsewhere, the short-term bond yield and price rise at the same time can also mean the market is still looking for shelter despite the rise of yield.

How about the currency market? USD is rising against EUR again, and JPY is rising against USD, also again. USD drops against GBP though (again according to bloomberg figures).

EUR:USD -> 1.3572

GBP:USD -> 1.7400

USD:JPY -> 101.77

The trend may mean a turn back for USD and JPY. GBP is still stable so far (yes, so far, but at least thank Gordon Brown). Integrating with the above phenomena: credit is tight on financial institutions; demand on bond is still substantial, and easy money like USD and JPY is still not accessible; US credit crisis is far from relaxing, not to mention resolving. If financial instiutions continue their divestment, then the stock market of US will continue to tumble. Meanwhile, property market is still tight judging by the high risk premium on mortgages. Both markets will hammer the derivatives and futures markets, and initiate further losses on and sucks liquidity from banks and financial institutions. Such tide-up will tighten the credit of banks again due to write-off on balance sheet and compliance to accounting principle. The cycle will continue.

So, can we expect a deep V? It can be a deep V, but for sure it is not LV (Long deep-V).

Or, actually I can think of a forth explanation on the rise of AAA rates amidst the fall of LIBOR: helicopter is there. Bernake and Paulson, like the Joker (Jack Nicolson) in Batman 1 (by Tim Burton), will throw as much money on the street as they like. If I were the bank, understanding that there would be a "competitor" with "unlimited" money supply and authority to loan at will (at any rates), why did I drop the rate and bear the risk myself? Particularly I know it cuts really deep?

Just pray that our Jokers will not be like Jack the Joker who spreaded poisonous gas at the same time. Don't forget about the national debt, and the flooding USD.

Rates Update

Up to now, the saving measures have a very limited effects:

Risk Premium:
1 month LIBOR: 309 pts
3 month LIBOR: 332 pts
5-yr AAA: 475 pts
10-yr AAA: 600pts (!)

30-yr Fixed Mortgage: 466 pts
15-yr Fixed Mortgage: 440 pts
5/1-yr ARM: 443 pts
1-yr ARM: 582 pts
30-yr Fixed JUMBO: 596 pts
15-year Fixed JUMBO: 533 pts
5/1-yr ARM JUMBO: 467 pts

NONE OF THEM HAS IMPROVED!

Will the BOE measures work?
The dilemma is :
if not save, the bank that does not use it can still subject to further pressures from the market. Only the biggest bank with good fame can take this burden. Even so, the risk of insolvency is high. The good side is: incompetent bank will no longer be in the market and further poison it. The risk is: panic, and despair.

if save, it means that the beneficary bank is really in trouble. For the moment a sharp drop may be ceased by the government action. Yet, its future is even more uncertain. Once the government invests, it locks in. Tales about inefficiency and political interference of SOEs are no news to the public. The handling of these acquired banks, after the turmoil, is another headache.

Maybe a combination of direct injection, nationalization, endorsement, acquistion, and exchange of problematic asset by government bonds may help out the current situation. However, it also means the huge accumulation of government debt as well as an influx of "money" into the black-holes. Governments use their own credits, at the risk that eventually even the government will bankrupt and its currency will greatly depreciate, meanwhile deflation is still happening inside that country (which is completely against conventional economic concept but can happen as its asset also loses price).

Dilemma (Con't).

If I were the investors of the bank, and with the information that the government will take over, what will I do?

The government invests on the banks to provide capital to polish the balance sheet. It also lowers the volume of available shares in the market (and hence drive the price up, or at least stop tanking of the stock price, and hence the book value of the equity). However, whichever bank accepts this investment gives the signal that it is in deep problem. The larger the amount, the bigger and deeper the black-hole. In case the black-hole is too large and deep to be saved, under the consideration of stopping panic, government may take-over the bank to continue its operation and prevent massive withdrawal. But, government will not simply just eat the rotten tomato, and there may not be just one rotten tomato. Merger and buyout, under government's guide, will happen when situation "stablizes", or on the contrary, may happen immediately to avoid further worsening. Restructuring, in the company and in the market, can be expected. Job cut by these banks may not happen immediately (or the panic will continue), but it will continue after the panic period, after restructuring takes place.

Go back to the question: if I were the investor, what will I do?

In case I look for long-term investment return, I will not dare to invest on them at all. In case I hold shares of them, even at a low price, divest them. Even though there may be a chance of its survival, and, after restructuring, its result will improve and hence its stock price may increase again. However, there are too many uncertainties. Particularly once government takes over the ownership, the transaction terms and deal will no longer be a purely commercial decisions. Chances are transferral at a premium (especially if transaction takes place among "natoinalized banks") and the acquirer will have to take a heavy burden for a few years before full recovery. During the same period, one may find other more transparent and market based companies to invest on. At worst, receiving interest through the shamed deposit rate is still better than exposing to another 10-20% downside risk. Opportunity is always there; just whether or not one grasp it when it is there.

Dilemma

If I were the US government, what would I do?

I would have nationalized everything: banks, thrifters, and even home owners (?!). I would be the major shareholder of banks and make them continue to lend money. I would be the major shareholder of thrifters to gurantee all CDOs. I would, well, finance the home owners directly so that they can continue to pay the thrifters and banks.

However, if that is the case, will the stock market will be out of troubles? What will the investors think?

Chain Reactions

Now with the credit crunch, various companies will face shortage of cash and may result in solvency issue. The possibilities of bankrupcy has increased. But this is not the end of it. Many of these firms had issued bonds and many buyers of these bonds also buy the CDS (credit default swap) from banks and financial institutions for hedging purpose. Now as banks and financial instituions are in deep dangers that trigger their clients' liquidity problems, it can cause the both the bankrupcy and the inability to honor all CDS which in turn trigger another wave of scare on the banking system. If they couple with the problems on Alt-A and credit card loans, a huge global recession can be expected.

Interesting Observation...

The most updated key rates spread are as follows:

1-month libor: 301pts

3-month libor: 325pts

5-yr AAA: 468pts

10-yr AAA: 593pts

30-yr fixed mortgage: 447pts

15-yr fixed mortgage: 423pts

1-year ARM: 570pts

30-yr fixed JUMBO: 582pts

15-yr fixed JUMBO: 523pts

Two horrible observations:

1. 1-month libor now is higher than the prime rate, even though just by 1 basis point. It means that bank lends money to another bank is even "riskier", from the bank's point of view, then bank lends money to an individual.
2. 10-year AAA banking and finace rate is even higher than 1-year ARM (and no need to mention about 15 and 30 year fixed rate) by 23 basis point. Bank is even not trusted by their colleagues than the trust on an individual who may just have nothing but a social insurance number to purchase a flat.

Another observation that may tell more stories:

M2 Money supply by Fed:

June 1st wk: -10.8b, June 2nd wk: -6.8b, June 3rd wk: 2.4b, June 4th wk: -23.6b

July 1st wk: 24.5b, July 2nd wk: 0.3b, July 3rd wk: 48.7b, July 4th wk: -14.2b

Aug 1st wk: -8.8b, Aug 2nd wk: 7.0b, Aug 3rd wk: -10.5b, Aug 4th wk: 3.9b

Sept 1st wk: -5.5b, Sept 2nd wk: -1.9b, Sept 3rd wk: 20.6b, Sept 4th wk: 165.5b

Oct 1st wk: -4.0b

From June to August only 12.1b USD was supplied to the market by FED, unlike the beginning of the year (almost 20-30b every week). This may partly explain why actually the capital market loses fuel to continue the rebound. Of course, once trust is lost; the money borrowed will not go to the market but back to bank's balance sheet. Nevertheless, the situation at the beginning of the year is less worse than the middle. Particularly when more banks find themselves eventually will face their judgement days, they will become more conservative and are willing to hold risk-free asset (for a low yield) and hence money flows back to US treasury and FED.

Same trend continues on September at a more extreme scale. Only by the last week (when special credit event happened) FED supplied a real substantial amount at 165.5b at once. But then on the last week, FED "received" money again ("-4.0b"). It is rather obvious that to keep the business running, banks and financial institutions have to feed money to the black-hole like balance sheet. And these money can only go nowhere but back to almost risk-free asset, i.e. government bonds, certificate of deposits, or plain cash.

Unappealing enough, there are something also notable:

USD->JPY: 98.66

EUR->USD: 1.3548

GBP->USD: 1.6966

USD->CAD: 0.861

USD->AUD: 0.6618

USD->RMB: 6.8318

Just a day JPY keeps climbing while other OECD currencies keep tanking. So is RMB. In a sense USD is "climbing" against other OECD currencies except JPY. But again, if USD flows back to US for balance sheet, the expansion of credit by FED indirectly to the market does nothing good at all. On the other hand, comparing with countries with sufficient reserve or with foreign currency control (Japan and China respectively), USD keeps dropping: it is an unwanted currency or has no channel to leave the country. Combining together, USD is contracting all the way back to its country at a big discount (as OECD countries' asset has lost value by 60-70%) and is not welcomed (or blocked). It means the losing influence of USD on the world.

Once such a trend/attitude is formed, soon enough the demand and supplies of USD will form a "super-conducting loop": USD from FED to bank and then back to FED and to bank, with little multiplier effects due to high distrust on market and low level of investment.

What does it mean? It means liquidity trap: see what Japan has been.

OLD 7: 2008-10-8

Dear friends and investors,

The credit crunch is nowhere close to an end. Take a look on this (please remember, FED has reduced the target rate from 5.00% to 1.50% during the period):

Risk Premium from Risk free rate (FED):
1 Month LIBOR: 37 pts (1 year prior) -> 49 pts (1 month prior) -> 279 pts (current)

3 Month LIBOR: 50 pts (1 year prior) -> 82 pts (1 month prior) -> 302 pts (current)

5 Year AAA Finance and Banking Rate: 36 pts (1 year prior) -> 286 pts (1 month prior) -> 464 pts (current)

10 Year AAA Finance and Banking Rate: 91 pts (1 year prior) -> 379 pts (1 month prior) -> 582 pts (current)


Property Market is still horrible:

Risk Premium from Risk free rate (FED):
30 Year Fixed: 132 pts (1 year prior) -> 408 pts (1 month prior) -> 432 pts (current)

15 Year Fixed: 95 pts (1 year prior) -> 362 pts (1 month prior) -> 402 pts (current)

1 Year ARM: 97 pts (1 year prior) -> 394 pts (1 month prior) -> 560 pts (current)

30 Year Fixed JUMBO: 207 pts (1 year prior) -> 523 pts (1 month prior) -> 573 pts (current)

15 Year Fixed JUMBO: 180 pts (1 year prior) -> 447 pts (1 month prior) -> 506 pts (current)

5/1-Year ARM JUMBO: 168 pts (1 year prior) -> 428 pts (1 month prior) -> 461 pts (current)

Even for the conforming long maturity fixed rate mortgage on which most stable home owners are applying, the risk premium has gone up by 3.3 times (while the target rate has been cutting). One can imagine how mad the bank is on CASH. Nothing but cash cash cash. Needless to mention about ARM on which most "aggressive" home owners are borrowing. Another worthy to note phenomenon is that the JUMBO rate, i.e. for non-conforming mortgage (mainly for luxurious homes or in a sense for speculators who operate an leverage), which has already been necessarily higher than conforming mortgage rate, has also increased by 2-3 folds. People, with more asset living at or speculating on luxurious houses, or with ordinary lives at ordinary homes, or with nothing but a driver licence or social insurance number, are all evaluated by banks as RISKY. This is a really worthy phenomenon to observe.

Meanwhile, we can also take a look on the currency rate (spot):
USD - JPY: 100.4
EUR - USD: 1.3652
GBP - USD: 1.7221
USD - CAD: 1.1244
USD - AUD: 1.4457
USD - RMB: 6.8233

What are the same rates at 1 year ago?
USD - JPY: 117.3
EUR - USD: 1.4206
GBP - USD: 2.0394
USD - CAD: 0.9837
USD - AUD: 1.1127
USD - RMB: 7.5149

USD seems "rebound" (I don't agree with this term). But it more actually goes up against other equally or more seriously screw-up currencies like EUR and GBP (both are hit hard by financial turmoil) and CAD and AUD (both are hit by anticipation on lower consumption and hence lower demand on raw materials). JPY, despite its suck economy, has sufficient savings and reserves and hence somehow are "liked" by investors (at least its financial sector had screwed up way before other OECD countries, and by the never-hitting-same-tree-twice theory, it is safe, for now...). RMB is more interesting one. While its value is still stable due to its "isolation" from the world economy, it also subjects to a potential foreign investment withdrawal to cover their own asses.

Following the same logic, since most investment institutions and investors are holding their hands and withdraw their investments, and that cash is more preferred, gold price may not rocket as insufficient money for speculation and basic demand. But on the other hand, a collapse of gold price may not be seen in short-term, as there are investors using gold as a capital preserve tool, at least against inflating USD, EUR, GBP, etc (though evaporation rate may be higher).

Ok, enough pessimistic. Lets go for another way: what are the industries that may be able to survive?

As we can forsee a lack of easy credits and contraction on expenditure in the coming year, I think companies:

1. with substantial cash and null liabilities as well as tight cost control will find various opportunities for M&A,
2. related to daily consumptions, like fastfood chains, wal-mart like retail (cheap), cheap transportations, public utilities (electricity, gas, phone, internet), and cheap trading platforms (e-platforms),
3. in the government regulated business like also public utilities, public transportation, any green products required to comply with environmental regulations,
4. and professional firms that can help enhance company performance and provide restructuring, re-engineering, coperate governence, hiring and recruitment, change managment, etc solutions (like consulting firms, Big 4, law firms, HR, etc)

will have opportunities to survive.

(to be continued...)

David

OLD 6: 2008-10-7

Dear investors,

Please take a look at the following, though a bit old (Oct 3):

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&refer=conews&tkr=CAT%3AUS&sid=a7N_egLc7pqg

Interestingly some energy and material suppliers as well as machinery suppliers are still actually making good money even up to now.

I will dig their financial statements and see what I can come up with.

David

OLD 5: 2008-10-6

Dear Investors,

BDI is dropping like hell, and it is apparent that the bulk shipping industry has just received a great amount of cancel of existing orders and within at minimum a half a year the trend will not go up. The expectation on the China and India markets is also bad.

Thus, if we correct the view that the rebound will happen, then we can come up with another thinking: i.e. deflation can come before inflation. And the rebound on raw materials may not happen at all.

I will further update you about my thoughts. But for the moment, please remember: Cash is King.

Best regards,
David

OLD 4: 2008-9-25

Dear investors:

Please take a look on this news:
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601015&sid=a7TCuxaJcJDE&refer=munibonds

Now even the municipal bonds, traditionally not very coupled with national economy and has a stable interest rate, has its rate surges to a 6-year high. Sometimes they cannot even find the buyers. The distrust on US system is strong. Even if the 700b bailout is established and restore the creditability to the system, inevitably USD holders will not hold for long despite not many where else to go.

David

OLD 3: 2008-9-23

Dear friends,

Significant movements on Key Rates and Bond rates are noted:

LIBOR:
1month from 2.47% to 3.18%
3month from 2.81% to 3.20%

AAA Banking and Finance
5-year from 4.97% to 5.96%
10-year from 5.94 to 6.99%

These rates have significantly increased and have not dropped despite FED's announcement on saving measures.

Mortgage Rate changes are also interesting:

While 30-year and 15-year Fixed Rate has decreased by 39pts and 16pts respectively, the 1-year ARM has increased by 32pts instead.

Now T-bill Rate changes are similar to Mortgage Rate:
For 5-year and longer maturity bonds, yield rate rise and price drop.
For 2-year and 3-year maturity bonds, yield rate drop and price rise.
For coupons within a year, both yield rate and price rise.

If we integrate these information together, we can conclude that the trust in-between bank has been shaken and is still shaking, and instead of financing between banks banks look for funds from the government. It will induce a further weakening on other commercial activities as well. Besides, banks also seek short-term shelter on short-term government coupons and further hints a contraction on financial activities. Nevertheless, due to government intervention, confidence on USD is weakened and reflected on the rise of yield on longer maturity bonds.

On the property market, due to the drop on the market as well as the losing confidence of potential buyers (for self-use), the long term fixed mortgage rate is dropping which reflects the eagerness of attracting new buyers (to quick sell). Yet, the sub-prime and Alt-A part, reflected by 1-yr ARM rate, is increasing. So, the bank still evaluates higher risk of default on speculation market. If that is the case, it means the property market will still worsen. Coupling with the CDO and CDS problems on banks, the entire financial market will still subject to high fluctuation, with a bigger drop waiting at the end.

When the above scenarios further couples with the US government intervention, in the half a year period an expectation on the drop of USD and hence another rebound on Gold, Oil, and raw materials can be expected. The rebound inertia, however, may not be as substantial as early 2008, due to the possible lack of money on speculation. Yet, we can at least expect the rebound can compensate the gap of latest drop and may return to 50-day line above. After that, it will subject to market situations. The potential of deflation happening before hyper-inflation is still substantial and plausible.

Thus, for the coming 3-6 months, we had better continue a conservative strategy overall. Yet, grasping the rebound on commodities, we can either unload existing stocks at a higher price and take profit or (not really recommended) attempts to capture profit through surfing. Speculating on the downside of the equity market is another way of taking profit. On the other hand, although USD will subject to another downside pressure, speculating on the drop of USD against EUR, JPY, and other commodity currency is not recommended as the fluctuation may not be as big as last year, due to the downside of OECD economies, as well as competitiion from commodities and Gold.

Afterall, "CASH IS KING".

Best regards,
David Chan
P.S. The above are only my non-professional opinions. Please feel free to comment/critize/scorn at. :)

Disclaimer: The above is onyl a personal opinion and does not form any part of the wills or contracts to invite and ask for business, nor does the author have any direct and indirect benefits received through the sharing of opinions or attempt to benefit through the influence of others investment tendency and action. The sharing of opinions is purely voluntary and acts as a hobby.

OLD 2: 2008-7-23

Dear Investors,

With reference to the attached article, the sovereign fund of China had not made major investments on items/projects like overseas raw materials, energy, and other strategic materials but really on foreign financial institutions. If that is the case, it means both the strategic insight and execution ability of China sovereign fund are weak and ruthless.

In addition, according to the TV program I watched in China, the sales of household appliances are decreasing of this month are decreased by more than 10% than last month, including air conditioners! In other words, suffering from inflation, burst of bubbles of both equity and property markets, and the shrink of manufacturing and export business all combine together work largely against the further growth of internal consumption which once analysts had spoken highly of.

On the other side of the world, US still maintained a high mortgage rate, and even reached a record high of 6.40% for both 30year and 1year ARM. America Express interium result was disappointing and indicative of the forecoming collapse of credit market. Both added together will turn the overseas investors to be more risk-adverse than other period. Also, FED thus, facing a risk of credit crunch higher than hyper-inflation, will be "forced" to continue the low-interest policy to prevent from a total collapse.

Since the consumption by consumers in both OECD and China + India + SEAsia will decrease, the demand on raw material will also decrease. With such expectation, raw material price will readjust. The low USD currency rate may offset the loss of part of such decrease; nevertheless, with a forecoming credit crunch the hot money in the market will seek shelter on fixed-yield products. However, it may not be the US T-bills nor other government T-bills. It may be simple deposit on strong currency, credit swap contracts, or partially, gold.

Yet as gold's price is also subjected to market hot money's speculation, gold cannot be a 100% hedge against the depreciating USD. It will maintain on 926 +/- 50 level.

Overall speaking it is time to manage risk rather than seek return. Another wave of readjustment starts.

美元貶值 中國金融政策受挫
本周一（七月二十一日）是人民幣滙率改革三周年的日子，按中國外滙交易中心在當天公布，銀行同業外滙市場人民幣兌美元滙價報六點八二七一，較滙改前八點二七六五升值百分之二十一點二三，這個升幅，對於中國外貿出口、金融穩定以至國家金融政策應該「何去何從」，都有深刻和長遠的影響。
人民幣升值，主要原因之一是美元貶值速度太快，如果以兌日圓、英鎊等貨幣計，人民幣升幅要小得多，兌歐羅甚至出現貶值。人民幣兌美元滙價不斷攀升，至少為中國政府帶來了三大難題。第一、是外滙儲備萎縮。根據人民銀行七月十五日的數字，截至今年六月底國家的外滙儲備達一萬八千多億美元，由於絕大部分是美元資產，美元貶值令外滙儲備損失慘重，內地經濟學者推算，如果外儲八成以上是美元資產，在一個月內蒸發的外儲金額就達到三百億美元。第二、是美國的金融風暴會直接影響中國。據美國財政部在上月三十日公布的海外持有美國證券狀況報告，中國持有約三千七百六十億美元公司債券，其中資產支持的債券達二千零六十億美元，這種債券主要是住房抵押債券，由房利美和房貸美兩家機構發行或擔保；眾所周知，「兩房」股價在出事後一度暴跌達五成，換言之，兩房債券的風險也波及中國，原來用以保值的美元資產，現在反過來為中國造成更大損失。第三、中國的巨額外儲中有二千億美元通過外滙投資公司進行海外投資，但佔頗大比例仍然投資在美元資產上，其中以去年五月收購百仕通一成股份的投資損失最大，上周五百仕通收市價為十七點二九美元，中投的賬面虧損達十二點四八億美元，跌幅超過四成。至於另一筆的五十億美元購入摩根士丹利可轉換股權單位的交易，也同樣因大摩股價下跌而造成虧損，雖然上述兩項損失都只在賬面上反映，但美國市場的波動加上美元長期弱勢，中國往往會吃眼前虧而又對「慘況」無能為力！
中國要作為經濟大國，最終必須制定自己一套金融政策，放棄與美元掛鈎，否則在國際金融市場上始終無法有效控制風險、被美元牽着鼻子走，現在人民幣兌美元升值速度加快，也是出現在美國次按危機升級之後，聯儲局因擔心信貸收縮和經濟衰退而向市場注入大量流動性，把利率大幅調低，大大加重了人民幣的升值壓力。事實上，現在連胡錦濤主席在年初提出的從緊貨幣政策也難以維持，主要就是因為美國金融風暴轉趨惡化，連帶中國受「牽連」，國家的宏觀調控無法落實，長此以往，不但貨幣政策，連經濟政策也會成為美國的附庸！
人民幣滙價上升，是造成企業出口疲弱的主因之一，當前珠三角、山東等外資企業紛紛倒閉，除了內地產業政策調整令成本上漲，人民幣升值加快令企業利潤大幅收窄，也是重要原因。根據內地媒體的調查，一名長三角的廠商去年年底接到一筆一百萬美元的訂單，以當時人民幣滙率七點三〇四四六作為報價，到了今年三月底的中間價已上升至七點〇一九，美元貶值，廠商在滙率損失達到二十八萬五千多元（人民幣．下同），以紡織品一般利潤率百分之五計，這筆訂單的應有利潤約為三十六點五萬元，經滙率因素「打折」，利潤所得最後不到八萬元，令廠商損失慘重。
隨着內地資本市場進一步開放，人民幣滙率是否應該沿用傳統的貿易和出口指標，正受到不少質疑，國內金融界認為，以資本市場的流動性來衡量滙價，是另一個可行的參考辦法，尤其近期境外資本流入的數量飆升，中國外儲持續保持高增長，資金進出影響人民幣滙率的作用正愈來愈大。因應新形勢，調節人民幣滙價的形成機制，看來是中國政府急不容緩的任務。

OLD 1: 2008-7-19

Dear Investors, please take some time to read today's old cho's column. Meaningful. I guess for our fund portfolio, the time to switch out more to parking fund to lock the profit has been arriving. We can switch some part of material and mining fund more (but not all) to parking fund first, only maintain not more than 8-10% in our portfolio. Besides, stock-wise, in case anyone of us holds certain material stocks, pls also start to divest part of it.

兩房變成植物人
曹仁超
7月16日，周三。恒指低開後回升，收市21223.5，升48.73；成交598億元。7月期指升150點，收21210點。
滬深三百指數跌3.76％，收2745.6。利好預期落空，市場又再進入漫長尋底過程。投資者除咗繼續耐心等待之外，可以做嘅嘢唔多。地產板塊跌幅超過6％，有接近十家地產股跌停，包括北辰、上實發展、華業地產等，金融、鋼鐵、有色及煤炭亦成為跌市主力。據上海交易所數據顯示，7月1日至8日嘅六個交易天內，機構投資者資金淨流出104億元人民幣。基金同散戶唔同，近日利用滬深A股反彈減持，理由係外圍股市甚差；反之，散戶仍信北京奧運可帶來沖喜。外資擬撤出中國股份
換言之，8月份如內地股市不升，擔心將引發散戶大舉拋售。JP摩根私人銀行（管理4000億美元）認為，依家喺美國發生嘅事冇可能唔响亞洲區出現。睇嚟外資正由中國股份身上流走。
英國6月份CPI可能升3.8％，係1992年以來最高（其中食物價格升幅超過10％，汽油價格較5月份上升5％），代表六十萬公務員可能發動四十八小時罷工行動去爭取加薪，並傳出英鎊將加息。
日本銀行估計，日本2008／09年度（3月結）GDP增長率只有1.2％，通脹率1.8％，日本人工資及企業純利仍走下坡。睇嚟日本2003年4月開始嘅溫和繁榮期又再結束。
格蛇唔認為美國經濟下半年會出現回升，信貸危機可能會拖到明年。標普首席經濟學家戴維．懷斯認為，最糟糕嘅時候仲未到臨！美國財政部寄出退稅支票後，消費者兌現呢D支票嘅速度較預期要快，呢D錢一用完後，衰退便來，估計最糟糕時候係明年第一季。
索羅斯認為，2008年係超級大泡沫破裂嘅日子，情況有如1930年，實際上人們剛剛開始感受到呢場危機對實際經濟所造成嘅影響，未來痛苦日子仲好長。房利美及房貸美事件唔係最後，而係開始咋，美國進入清還負債能力危機期（Solvency crisis），而非流動性危機（Liquidity crisis）。上述兩間公司短期內並唔缺乏資金，只係投資者質疑兩公司貸款人嘅未來還債能力。
因此，由聯儲局提供短期資金作用唔大，因為兩公司並唔需要，只有美國樓價止跌回升，才可大大提升貸款者未來還債能力。呢方面無論財長抑或聯儲局均無能為力（1990至2003年日本政府無法改變日本樓價方向，1997年8月至2003年4月本港特區政府亦改變不了香港樓價方向；未來美國政府得咩？）
《華爾街日報》引述美國聯儲局委員意見認為，貝南奇已江郎才盡，佢估計下半年美國經濟擴張速度略低於趨勢增長率，主因係房地產繼續不景氣、能源價格節節上升以及信貸狀況欠佳等。佢話今後兩年經濟增長率會逐漸加快腳步，但信徒已經唔多。
美國勞工部宣布，6月份生產商價格指數升9.2％，係1981年以來最大嘅年度漲幅。
投資者對美國整個金融體系缺乏信心，銀行股遭受十年來最大損失。繼加州IndyMac之後，National City股票交易一度被中止。Oppenheimer & Co.分析員Meredith Whitney過去曾正確預測花旗減派息，佢依家認為Wachovia Corp.前景暗淡，令該股股價急跌13％；估計今年每股虧損1.35美元，明年每股虧損35美仙。Wachovia今年內股價已下跌74％，周二再跌1.2美元，成8.64美元。冇阿媽生任由自生自滅
財長保爾森要求國會畀房利美及房貸美「絕對保證」及短期無上限貸款，但共和黨議員認為對納稅人負擔太大，睇嚟上述申請短期內不獲國會通過機會好大。Uncle Sam已決定收養房利美及房貸美，因為佢地係「GSE」（政府資助機構）。至於其他金融機構，由於冇阿媽生，任由自生自滅。美國證監會宣布唔准淨拋空房利美、房貸美及雷曼兄弟、高盛、美林或大摩等十九間金融機構嘅股份，若拋空必須先借貨，務求支持金融公司股價（美國政府已愈嚟愈唔尊重自由市場矣）。房利美响1938年、房貸美响1970年由國會製造出來，有阿媽生的確唔同D，不過救番又點？兩隻股份現已跌價80％，擔心已失去派息能力（房貸美去年派息15.5億美元、房利美24.8億美元，依家可能已變成植物人，因過去二十八年嚟嘅利率回落期已結束）。
2000年科網股泡沫破裂後，2002年10月股市才見底；2007年8月次按危機後，需時幾耐？次按危機估計最終會拖垮油價，依家似乎已開始。如無意外，油價好快會由146美元回落到100美元，引發原材料價格崩潰。2009年我地面對嘅壓力唔係通脹，而係「信貸崩潰」（credit crash）！美國油股ETF周二跌幅達到5.2％，成111.36美元。早喺油價下跌前，美國石油股已率先回落。唔好以為中東油佬好掂
唔好以為中東油佬好掂，唔信請睇睇沙地阿拉伯股市指數，早由2006年2月26日回落，去年出現反彈，今年又再跌過，並喺7月15日再跌穿今年3月低點，繼續尋底【圖】。願天下股民皆同聲一哭！
溝上唔溝落，有邊個諗過以每股30美仙吸納IndyMac，結果係全軍盡墨？1973至74年和記由每股43元跌至7元，我老曹開始溝落，7元、6元、5元……最後係1蚊，自己50萬元投資响半年內變成10萬元！好彩和記冇破產，不然你地今日一定冇曹仁超日記睇，亦冇人再聲嘶力歇叫人唔好「溝落」。响熊市中，只能動用30％資金去玩（唔好希望自己能跑贏大市！呢點連畢非德亦做唔到），記住保存70％資金（Keep your powder dry）！有智慧不如趁勢，「人」嘅力量永遠唔及「熊」，只有乖乖地度過嚴冬，留番D種子春天時播種用。如果你唔喺秋天收成、冬天藏糧，春天來到又點？
人民幣自2005年7月21日起升值，至今已漸漸抑制中國產品嘅出口能力，而增加咗入口產品嘅能力。如今製鞋、製衣、玩具加工、電子加工等低利潤行業已面對工廠外移（或內移）甚至倒閉，進入青黃不接期；高技術產品仍未發展起來，但依賴密集勞動嘅工業卻在加速淘汰，最惡劣日子相信係今年下半年或明年上半年，能夠捱過者可生存，否則便淘汰。
下半年中國汽油相信進入上調期（上一次係6月20日）。中國成品油由去年10月31日起至今只上調過一次，形成每加工一噸成品油要虧損1000元人民幣，加工及進口石油都出現嚴重虧損，引致大部分地方煉油廠停工或半停工。汽油短缺由廣東、廣西、雲南、浙江、上海……從南向北蔓延。今年6月20日上調成品油價後，由於國際油價進一步上升，令加工一噸成品油要虧損2000多元人民幣；加上地方煉油廠已停工（或半停工），變成大部分成品油由國營企業供應，到處都出現短缺。相信奧運過後，有很大需要大幅調整成品油價格。
糧價又點？舊年12月泰國大米每噸376美元，今年4月17日升至1000美元，引發埃及、喀麥隆、科特迪瓦、塞內加爾、布基那法索、埃塞俄比亞、印尼、馬達加斯加、菲律賓、海地等地區發生騷亂；海地總理愛德華因此下台。反而中國糧價十分穩定，除咗去年12月20日取消小麥、玉米等出口退稅，今年1月1日宣布上述產品出口關稅，以及今年1月19日宣布出口配給制外，內地糧價基本上穩定。理由係中國糧食自給率達95％，加上過去四年豐收，政府有能力阻力內地糧價上升，形成同國際糧價脫節；只係農夫面對化肥漲價，農產品價格唔漲嘅日子可維持幾耐？
日前報道有600萬美元先至可退休，呢個數字唔係我老曹計算出嚟，而係由《巴隆氏》呢份金融財經界權威計算所得，數字都幾嚇人（或令大部分中產階級心碎）。
1967年剛離開學校時，我老曹已想發達，目標係賺100萬元（當年百萬已係富翁）。1980年，我老曹已賺到100萬元，當年同森池兄遠足，同行者有位係森池兄口頭上叫「契爺」嘅公務員，佢1964年五十五歲已退休，退休時揸住幾十萬元，到1980年七十一歲仍身壯力健，但已唔夠錢使。佢教我地要有1000萬元才好退休。喺1980年，1000萬元已係唔少嘢；1994年森池兄賺到1億元才退休，今時今日仍然豐衣足食。每年失去5%購買力
自1971年美元唔再同黃金掛鈎後，美元購買力以每年5％速度失去。今天600萬美元嘅購買力，二十五年後只餘下166萬美元。除非你係理財專家，否則冇人能保證每年投資收益都係正回報。點樣每年皆跑贏失去嘅5％購買力？並唔容易。1997至2007年恒生指數每年平均只升2.5％，而過去十年樓價除豪宅外都係負回報。
何況人到最後三年嘅醫療支出，係佔咗一生人中嘅50％。今天養和醫院二等房（包括醫生費）一天開支大約1.5萬元；如住喺法國醫院，上述開支減半，即7500元一天。以兩夫婦計，最後三年醫療費用（如住私家醫院）大大話話至少500萬元。
退休並唔係一般人想像咁輕鬆。請睇吓嗰D喺1978年前退休嘅港人今天生活點樣？今天佢地嘅情況，三十年後將响閣下身上發生。請唔好忘記金錢購買力正以每年5％嘅速度減少。
今年5月五卡鑽石可以100萬美元售出，較一年前升值76.5％。粉紅色鑽石升幅達75％、湖水藍鑽石升幅超過100％。五年前十卡或以上完美鑽石每卡可售7萬美元，今年非20萬美元以上一卡不可，因為每年新發現五卡或以上完美鑽石少於二百粒，粉紅色或湖水藍者更少，好多時有錢亦未必買得到。三個月前一顆D無瑕二百四十三點九六卡鑽石以5000萬英鎊售出（買家係亞洲人，身份通常唔透露），打破1995年5月响日內瓦蘇富比拍賣嘅一顆一百點一卡梨形鑽石售價1650萬美元。睇嚟鑽石較股票及房地產更有投資價值（少於一卡者則冇投資價值）。
David