美國政府宣佈的一萬億美元排毒方案引發前晚美股強力反彈。市場認為此方案應能解決銀行毒產所導致的流動性不足的問題。可是，與此同時，市場亦憂慮惡性通脹將臨，並引發各原材料和TIPS的價格急升；儘管金價卻依然不振，國債價格亦未見大幅滑坡。
要理解這些現像，首先要把此方案和早前美聯儲局購買新發行國債的事件聯立未看。
此方案的重點就是把毒產從銀行的資產負債表中” 搬運” 至另一個” 特別設備” 的”貨倉” ，”特別設備”由出資者提供，政府負責付一半的”設備採購費” 並付” 倉租” 和” 貨品保險” ，貨品的保存/轉讓和貨倉的管理由出資者負責，盈虧自負。唯一規定時出資者不能在毒貨的毒性未” 衰變” 完成時就隨便買賣。直待時機好轉，” 毒性” 已經”衰變” 後，方才容許買賣。買賣後收益在扣除政府要求的部份(相信只會收回極微薄的利息) 歸於出資者。
站在銀行來看，當大量不明朗的有毒資產被抽離後，縱使生意短期內仍然疲弱，甚至仍然需要在集資去維持資本充足比，但是至少能重新較有譜地評估和管理風險，讓從聯儲局拆借來的資金用於放貸業務上，令自己和市場都可以暫時脫困。
站在出資者的角度，這是一筆大槓桿的生意。跟銀行不同的是，出資者的錢來自私人渠道，風險已經由其本身衡量，而且基本上不直接牽涉銀行融資，令到毒產不會重回銀行。其次，出資者不像銀行般靠放貸去維持生意，更無須符合任何資本充足比的條件；出資者無非就是做毒貨儲存至毒性散失再賣出的生意，只要出資者本身不用銀團貸款，沒有人逼倉，則所有的虧損都是賬面上的；再加上不是上市公司，其會計賬目既不用公開亦不需時刻調節至用市價入賬。就算真的需要，只要不涉及貸款，則其賬面損失更可以抵稅。再加上政府還會支付一半的資本和租金，相信此時有銀在手的富豪應感興趣。
當然，這不是毫無風險的。
最明顯的是如果美國政府為了救毒產而大量發行貨幣去填補黑洞，最終導致美元泛濫而大幅貶值，結果引起惡性通脹—溫和通脹可以讓毒產散毒，但是惡性通脹卻讓這類毒產的實則回報下降而最終成為廢紙。
另外一個非常明顯的風險是如果美國的經濟無法在一至兩年內復甦，並一方面重新創造新職位以回復國民信心，另一方面創造新產品和新價值以回復市場對美國為首的投資信心的話，則恐怕將會引發另一輪的崩盤，而且這次美國再拿不出信用去籌措資金支援復甦。屆時，那些毒產的價值和價格都會歸零，甚至如果計算利息的話，將會是負回報，連部份原本還有實力的投資者也損手。
因此聯儲局上星期高調宣佈購買新發行的國庫債券的行動就非比尋常。儘管聯儲局和財政部其實一向都有購買或回購新發行和二手市場的債券去控制美元的供應(詳細可參考格林斯平的自傳) ，但是一向都是默默進行。如此高調宣佈則是首次。除了表示美國維持國債的價值的決心外，實則上亦明顯地要托起債券的價格，一方面讓市場能維持其對美債作為避風港的角色，另一方面亦有利聯邦財政部籌錢去實行其刺激經濟的計劃。後者甚至比前者重要，前者現時為後者服務。只有在聯邦政府通過公共開支去開發和營運基建，改革醫療保險和退休金制度，加強國民教育以及扶植新的企業，方才能繞過已經五勞七傷的銀行業直接讓資金去支援各行業，以期最終能落到市民的口袋裡，讓他們能繼續支撐房產(於是毒產亦不會更毒) 和消費(重新帶動經濟) 。
當一切順利時，財政部能在毒產發售後收回本利，同時亦能在稅收中收回。如果僥倖地有一兩個新興行業或死而復生行業跑出，更可以重新吸引資金(即資源) 集中在美國，連美元和負債問題一併解決。
可是，事情未必如此理想—因為有兩大根本問題能拖垮這個策略：僵屍企業和再槓桿化。
原本政府公共開支除了達到抒緩就業壓力的短期目標外，更重要是在私營部門搆不著的範圍外改善國家總體的競爭力，使世界的資源願意投放到該地去出產價值—無論是改善硬件的效率和產能(基建) ，還是改善軟件的質素和創新(教育和鼓勵創造的環境) 。只有這樣那些開支才有意義。
問題是：科網快速發展後，美國到現時為止，除了讓國民更會消費，以及企業更多的欺詐外，從未再創造任何價值。僵屍企業是其中的一個典型：它們吸取了大量的資源，卻在商僚和工會的雙重干擾下，這些資源只花在滿足與個人貢獻不相稱的工資上，產出的價值卻有跌無升，至為其他地區的企業取代。要命的是，此類企業在美國分佈在各行各業，嚴重地束縛資源和人材，以致公共基礎建設帶來的改善無法產生作用，淪為大白象。
不過，論嚴重性，再槓桿化所引起的道德問題比上述的更可怕。
再槓桿化的手段明顯地是用公共資源去為不負責任的商僚們的不負責任的決定埋單。這只會鼓勵企業彷效上述的僵屍企業—好景時亂來以職謀私，逆境時等政府打救。此外，這一場金融海嘯的生成，究其原因就是由不受監管的槓桿操作引起的。現在不但沒有好好總結教訓，提出合理的機制讓槓桿” 靠譜” 和加強風險管理意識，相反卻重新用槓桿膨漲，以泡沫對泡沫，一旦下一個短暫的泡沫爆破，則美元會受各投資者捨棄，惡性通脹真正重臨。
現在明顯地美國政府把賭注押在能夠兩年內解決問題。如果能夠在這段時間內復甦，不單樓市股市鬆縛，政府亦期望能夠有一筆特殊收入去減少負債。這或許是短債的孳息率低（政府採購）而長債的孳息率高（多發行予其他央行和機構去買以集資）的原因。利用短債的靈活性去融資予對方，利用長債的時間性容許美國無須快速還債，並且如果加上通漲的話，連金額也可以少還。
如果事情的確是這樣，那麼再加上現時流通於市場的貨幣依然不足：3個月的國庫債券和同期的同業隔夜拆息的息差(TED) 仍有100點子；第一手短期國庫債券的孳息重新下降(4-week: lowering since week 6th; 3-month: lowering since week 7th; 6-month: lowering since week 9th)；5年的3A的銀金機構的風險息差達513點子，10年期的則有567點子；M2貨幣供應由2009年第一星期至第十二星期為USD230.4b，與去年同比的USD257.2b還少了USD26.8b；則明顯地政府增發的貨幣主要是去了銀行的資產負債表裡(即所謂的”量化寬鬆” 的精義) ，而現時在市場流動的資金仍然是機構投資者，私人投資者和散戶的錢。在前一年的有根據的恐慌中，不少資金暫時撤離市場觀察。在業績公佈期，聽到差的消息就進一步避險，好消息就出擊。
另外，經濟本身並無真正起色：失業率沒有改善，至於所謂的二手房銷售數字上升高於預期，一來該數字(4.72million) 乃是以統計模型除噪音後的全年銷售估計，並不代表即月數字—事實上最近兩個月的實際數值都已經跌到一年逐月新低，分別是257k(JAN) 和280k(FEB) ；去季平均每月約365k，去年同月同比約312k；再者，別忘記一月和二月份的二手房價格中位數和平均數分別為：USD164.8k(JAN) + USD165.4k(FEB) 和 USD206.7k(JAN) + USD209.7k(FEB) ；和去季的數字USD180.8k + USD223.4k以及去年同比USD195.8k + USD242.2k的數字均為回落。就算把季節性變化除去，仍然不見得市場有任何回復—無論買賣宗數和售價依然比往年同期低，和2006及2007年的全年平均數字比亦依然回落。
所以美國政府這個剝離毒產措施可以被視為近乎絕望中所採取的手段：由今年一月至二月，財政赤字已增加USD276.4b，但是同期M2的增加卻只有USD133.2b，連增加的赤字一半都沒有(48.19%)。那些差額到底去了哪裡，大家心中有數。不把這堆毒產從銀行抽離，則希望銀行能重新借錢再槓桿化的希望肯定落空。可是，就算現在宣佈了這個計劃，縱使樂觀點看認為市場的反應正面，由找尋出資者和經理人，提交計劃書，審批以致上馬落實，恐怕又要三數個月至半年不等。估計屆時政府第一批工程應該可以開始(最快的話) 。也就是說，假設未有其他黑天鵝消息而這剝離毒產計劃真的起效的話，最樂觀的情況是美國經濟活動於最後一季重新解凍。
因此，在政府資金尚未真正全面進入市場並製造就業，毒產計劃尚未恢復銀行的貸款能力，市場資金尚未全程長較長線投入，國際其他地區尚未釋疑時，現在仍然是面臨通縮塘水滾塘魚的格局。資金將會在短炒股市消息（或中揸部份有可為之蟹貨），避險如國債，及所謂通漲預期加政府開支如各原材料及其相關股票，和一些所謂的未來之星遊走。但是，由於現時至約半年內通縮的威脅應該比通漲強，再加上歐洲、日本和澳洲的經濟應該也好不了哪裡去，美匯和美債在炒完通漲消息及概念後應能穩固。美債作為避風港的角色會和黃金有既競爭（當其中一者價格已上升得相當高而另一方較低，如現時的黃金價格仍在900USD/ounce以上）又共榮(當股市在熱炒中遇壞消息甚至是黑天鵝時) 。原材料則要與原材料股分別對待：前者在有政府工程刺激下會穩固及溫和上升；後者則只因生產力嚴重過剩及資金成本和利息支出雙高而大大損害其盈利質素(如果仍有盈利的話) 而只適合炒消息而非長期持有。更何況由最近Baltic Dry Index已經回軟的情況看，各製造商已經完成補充一點庫存的動作並且維持其在較低水平。國內大鐵商由於專注高質鋼材而無法完全受惠於政策亦將面對新一輪的壓力。至至明日之星是需要細細挑選，在一般股民皆欠缺相關認識下，難以成功敲中，故此還是不宜沾手，待市場篩選更好。總的來說，能夠並願意回避風險者還是不隨便進場為宜；短炒者則注意在賺有薄利(5-10%)後宜賣出部份或全部的証卷獲利，並等待下一個入市的機會。
後記：筆者想起毒產散毒計劃的另一個問題：銀行未必願意賣出其毒產。乍聽起來不可能：誰願一直縛著計時炸彈在身？但是，反過來看，一旦出售，先不論是否賤賣以及把賬面損失變為實際損失的問題，光是賣出該等資產的數量就等於告訴競爭對手和市場自己的底牌。如果被發覺其過去所撇的壞賬原來只佔一小部份，其他人會怎樣看？更何況政策只惠及3A級的，那麼其他級數呢？就算銀行” 勇於認錯” ，真的大量變賣毒產，在供求關係下，價格可想而知。一旦賤賣後導致銀行的資本比率又不足，屆時銀行該如何做？假設銀行先前做大條虧損數以便今年報得”盈利” ，則變賣其毒產就等於斬斷其模糊” 拖字訣”政策的後路，以那些銀行的管理層來看就更不樂意了。
For the existing home sales and new home sales details, please refer to the following web sites:
http://www.realtor.org/research/research/ehsdata (existing home sales)
http://www.nahb.org/page.aspx/category/sectionID=131 (existhing and new home sales)
Saturday, March 28, 2009
Tuesday, March 24, 2009
Re-leveraging to Counter De-leveraging
The US Financial Secretary's announcement on the 1trillion US saving plan has injected cocaine on the stock market. All major markets worldwide have experienced a rise by 3-5%.
Integrating with the previous re-purchasing of newly issued Treasuries by FED, the intention of the method of implementing Obama's pledge now is clearer. US government attempts to counter deleveraging by releveraging.
The re-leveraging is done by the 1trillion plan by initiating the participation of private equity. The ideas is simple: US government provides "storage fee/rent" and "insurance" against the "goods" while the private equity stores at no cost with the expected gain through sitting over till asset re-appreciation. Since US government can decide the amount of "dividends" to be minimial and supply half of the capital, private equity can have a leverage around, say, 80-95%. In other words, any 10% increase on the goods' prices can result in the 16-19% increase on private equity's revenue. The remaining 5-10% will be the risk premium for US government to replenish its own capital after a short period.
Another important mechanism is the submission of proposals to US government to apply for "trading licence" for the "goods". Through such mechanism US government can also limit the number of "bidders" to maximize the "potential gain/expected return amount". The rather incompetitive market can also be more convenient to be monitored (or even manipulated when necessary): the key point is to maintain the price of the "goods".
A risk is associated with the above measure: the potential USD depreciation due to the pumping of money on the asset with uncertain value. Nevertheless, the FED's action of re-purchasing the newly issued treasuries has minimized the adverse effect.
The purchase at a premium can provide supports to the Treasuries price and maintain its shelter status. As long as there are other countries/parties continuing their supports, the demand of USD is there, and hence the price will not subject to great depreciation.
Also, the purchase itself injects money to the US government which will soon need a stable and an ample supply of capital. By the above action FED has stablized and capitalized, and can continue to supply the capital for US government low cost.
What will the US government do with the capital? Recall the previous stimuli plan?
The current saving measures are only a part of the plan, and only kill the pain. The source of the problem is the alreaady collapsed property and asset market. Property, being the last most reliable collateral next to land, will serve great purpose on rebooting the overall market.
To reboot the overall property market, they need people who can afford the property, or at least the mortgage of it. While the previous money selling approach by FED can serve the purpose of re-liquidating the market bypassing banks, the real deal comes with government expenditure, especuially on infra-structures, medical reformation, and potential new inventions on high-tech. US government needs money to perform these tasks, and FED prints to them by buying the US treasuries.
Ideally, the expenditure can bring jobs and income to public to continue the housing payment. The expectations can relax the risk of bank. Given that the toxic most asset was no longer in the balance sheet, the bank can re-start lending money. Meanwhile, the stablized property price can also provide support and liquidation to the toxic assets at the private equity's hands. Those companies will earn the bigger part while the smaller portion of the pie will go back to the government that can repay FED's balance sheet.
But it exposes to two risks:
1. The zombie enterprises will be a heavy laden that continues to waste precious resources that can be used elsewhere - be it the capital for reformed medical care, educational funds, or even capital for secondary industries with better operational efficiencies. Nevertheless, the afraid of job cutting will simply weaken the above measures: after the improvement of production efficiency through facilites, the actual benefit will not be significant due to the over-paid labour.
2. Moral risk - re-leveraging by concept is to encourage the market to leverage as much as to the previous level. It encourages another bubble without value creation. How long can such bubble persist? What if the bubble bursts again? It is sure that by that time USD will eventually lose its status and the trust from its buyers. A real hyper-inflation of USD will result.
Now the entire measure bets on the timely restoration of economy by 1-2 year time. As shown from the yield curve, the turning point is on the 2-year T-note. It can be a prove that the government purchases this maturity t-note most. By 1-2 year's time, the expected stablization and recovery can at least allow the government takes back some revenues from the toxic asset and returns to the FED through maturity of the T-note.
If that is the case, plus the free-available money is still short, as shown on the 3 month TED remains at 102 basis points premium, 5-year AAA finance risk premium is at 523 basis points and 10-year AAA finance risk premium is at 556 basis points, a speculation on stocks and commodities will happen. However, the over-capacity, high cost of capital and the eventual shortage of continuous fund will dry up the momentum of the raw material related stocks. Gold may increase when bad news happen, so is bond. These 2, of course, may not go up and down at the same time. USD against other currencies will stablize as capital will flow into US market to speculate on its government spending related projects.
BUT, as the real problem is not solved, or at least not sure if can be solved, a long term call perspective is still in vain.
Integrating with the previous re-purchasing of newly issued Treasuries by FED, the intention of the method of implementing Obama's pledge now is clearer. US government attempts to counter deleveraging by releveraging.
The re-leveraging is done by the 1trillion plan by initiating the participation of private equity. The ideas is simple: US government provides "storage fee/rent" and "insurance" against the "goods" while the private equity stores at no cost with the expected gain through sitting over till asset re-appreciation. Since US government can decide the amount of "dividends" to be minimial and supply half of the capital, private equity can have a leverage around, say, 80-95%. In other words, any 10% increase on the goods' prices can result in the 16-19% increase on private equity's revenue. The remaining 5-10% will be the risk premium for US government to replenish its own capital after a short period.
Another important mechanism is the submission of proposals to US government to apply for "trading licence" for the "goods". Through such mechanism US government can also limit the number of "bidders" to maximize the "potential gain/expected return amount". The rather incompetitive market can also be more convenient to be monitored (or even manipulated when necessary): the key point is to maintain the price of the "goods".
A risk is associated with the above measure: the potential USD depreciation due to the pumping of money on the asset with uncertain value. Nevertheless, the FED's action of re-purchasing the newly issued treasuries has minimized the adverse effect.
The purchase at a premium can provide supports to the Treasuries price and maintain its shelter status. As long as there are other countries/parties continuing their supports, the demand of USD is there, and hence the price will not subject to great depreciation.
Also, the purchase itself injects money to the US government which will soon need a stable and an ample supply of capital. By the above action FED has stablized and capitalized, and can continue to supply the capital for US government low cost.
What will the US government do with the capital? Recall the previous stimuli plan?
The current saving measures are only a part of the plan, and only kill the pain. The source of the problem is the alreaady collapsed property and asset market. Property, being the last most reliable collateral next to land, will serve great purpose on rebooting the overall market.
To reboot the overall property market, they need people who can afford the property, or at least the mortgage of it. While the previous money selling approach by FED can serve the purpose of re-liquidating the market bypassing banks, the real deal comes with government expenditure, especuially on infra-structures, medical reformation, and potential new inventions on high-tech. US government needs money to perform these tasks, and FED prints to them by buying the US treasuries.
Ideally, the expenditure can bring jobs and income to public to continue the housing payment. The expectations can relax the risk of bank. Given that the toxic most asset was no longer in the balance sheet, the bank can re-start lending money. Meanwhile, the stablized property price can also provide support and liquidation to the toxic assets at the private equity's hands. Those companies will earn the bigger part while the smaller portion of the pie will go back to the government that can repay FED's balance sheet.
But it exposes to two risks:
1. The zombie enterprises will be a heavy laden that continues to waste precious resources that can be used elsewhere - be it the capital for reformed medical care, educational funds, or even capital for secondary industries with better operational efficiencies. Nevertheless, the afraid of job cutting will simply weaken the above measures: after the improvement of production efficiency through facilites, the actual benefit will not be significant due to the over-paid labour.
2. Moral risk - re-leveraging by concept is to encourage the market to leverage as much as to the previous level. It encourages another bubble without value creation. How long can such bubble persist? What if the bubble bursts again? It is sure that by that time USD will eventually lose its status and the trust from its buyers. A real hyper-inflation of USD will result.
Now the entire measure bets on the timely restoration of economy by 1-2 year time. As shown from the yield curve, the turning point is on the 2-year T-note. It can be a prove that the government purchases this maturity t-note most. By 1-2 year's time, the expected stablization and recovery can at least allow the government takes back some revenues from the toxic asset and returns to the FED through maturity of the T-note.
If that is the case, plus the free-available money is still short, as shown on the 3 month TED remains at 102 basis points premium, 5-year AAA finance risk premium is at 523 basis points and 10-year AAA finance risk premium is at 556 basis points, a speculation on stocks and commodities will happen. However, the over-capacity, high cost of capital and the eventual shortage of continuous fund will dry up the momentum of the raw material related stocks. Gold may increase when bad news happen, so is bond. These 2, of course, may not go up and down at the same time. USD against other currencies will stablize as capital will flow into US market to speculate on its government spending related projects.
BUT, as the real problem is not solved, or at least not sure if can be solved, a long term call perspective is still in vain.
Friday, March 20, 2009
US Announcement on Purchase of Treasuries...
This is only an illusion.
Bond price had dropped to a stable price before last night yet the bid/cover ratio has shown sufficient interest from the bidders. In other words, market has not given up on UST yet.
Meanwhile, 2 weeks ago the 5-year and 10-year AAA banking and finance rate had shot up high to 6.x and 7.x percent respectively, considering the spreads from a 0.25% target rate, it has touched the recent 4-month high ever since Lehman Brothers' incident.
Therefore, in the last 2 weeks capital are running tight on banks.
The current support has already shown before last night's announcement. Nevertheless, the announcement took place AFTER the result announcement of Citibank, AIG, and others. The intention is questionable.
In case of manipulation, integrated with the previous sales of options by Citi's senior executives, government announcement may tend to "boost" the market for "bad asset selling" or "bad asset holding/refinancing" purposes.
In case of no manipulation, it can be a simple coincedence. Thus, the effect will soon be "decoupled".
No matter what cases, it is probable that US stock market will lose the rising momentum when the pumped money, mostly in 3-month/6-month term, reached maturity.
As the money was injected to the banking system instead of the market directly, inflation will not appear now. Hence, gold may not really surge as UST has returned as a risk shelter for the moment.
Bond price had dropped to a stable price before last night yet the bid/cover ratio has shown sufficient interest from the bidders. In other words, market has not given up on UST yet.
Meanwhile, 2 weeks ago the 5-year and 10-year AAA banking and finance rate had shot up high to 6.x and 7.x percent respectively, considering the spreads from a 0.25% target rate, it has touched the recent 4-month high ever since Lehman Brothers' incident.
Therefore, in the last 2 weeks capital are running tight on banks.
The current support has already shown before last night's announcement. Nevertheless, the announcement took place AFTER the result announcement of Citibank, AIG, and others. The intention is questionable.
In case of manipulation, integrated with the previous sales of options by Citi's senior executives, government announcement may tend to "boost" the market for "bad asset selling" or "bad asset holding/refinancing" purposes.
In case of no manipulation, it can be a simple coincedence. Thus, the effect will soon be "decoupled".
No matter what cases, it is probable that US stock market will lose the rising momentum when the pumped money, mostly in 3-month/6-month term, reached maturity.
As the money was injected to the banking system instead of the market directly, inflation will not appear now. Hence, gold may not really surge as UST has returned as a risk shelter for the moment.
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
論政 :“聯美制俄”和“聯美制日”????
論政，是論政道，政策，還是政略？我的觀察是多數爭拗是源於一方以政道而另一方以政略論時事。前者著眼的是價值，後者關注的是效果。儘管兩者互有關聯，卻不是一種固定的因果/主從的關係。就以這幾天爭論的事件來說：自由民主法治及其附屬觀點和解決矛盾的理念均是討論價值問題；可是，在國際關係中除了看應不應該這樣做，始終還要問能不能做，怎麼去做，這是方法問題。練先生提出法理上和技術上的依據甚好，至少能用較簡單別人也能接受的方法解決爭端。但是，這卻不表示在現時的情勢中雙方都會依這些框架來解決。於是這要求雙方都會有其他大小“非標”甚至“非法”的動作，這既沒有甚麼出奇，也難以完全可以用政道來規範。因此，當實際分析該事件時，除了看雙方正路的依據，也需要看當時的環境以及可供選擇的方案，甚至是否還要把事件衍生其他的含意。
順帶一提，我一直看到壇友提出“遠交近攻” 甚麼的來提出“聯美制俄”和“聯美制日”。先不論後兩者；遠交近攻既有秦滅六國的成功例子，亦有金滅遼後再滅北宋的失敗例子。聯美制俄還是聯美制日，關鍵根本不是中國民主與否，而是中國究竟會否和能否成為美國最大的競爭對手，或者被美國弄為假想敵。這是以國際權力爭鬥而不是什麼理念為基礎的。美國打伊拉克，是打給世界特別是歐洲看，回應回應你這個歐盟和歐羅有機會帶來的競爭。法國叫得最厲害，皆因西歐中以法國在中東有最大利益。
以現時的情勢來說，美國仍然是把中國當作最大的兩個假想敵之一（另一個當然是俄國）；日本對美國則根本不痛不癢—琪子而已。把日本納入導彈防禦系統是一把雙刃刀：既可以向著中俄，又可以控制了日本本身的軍隊—誰知道美國賣給日本的設備中會不會有”over-ride” 或突然死亡的裝置以防止日本反骨？如此美國對中國” 制日” 毫無需求；至於制俄：要是中國的實力/潛力比俄國更強，制來作甚？反之亦然。美國的重點仍然是讓中俄兩國互相制衡，誰強就傾斜另一方。中俄亦然。所以老鄧的養晦韜光的策略，把盡可能把俄國頂上去然後自己跟在身後，又或者就算俄弱更不能乘機踐踏以多樹美國的敵人才能就中取事，方為對策。
AND :
不論制還是防，甚至攻，說到底都是製造/改變形勢使敵就我。現代的利益並不單止在人和土地，尚有貿易，知識以及衍生出來的價值觀。因此，國際關係變得多樣和自相矛盾化，難以只用一種觀念和策略貫穿。外交和戰略也變得不穩定和多變。要在這種形勢下不被環境牽著走，較簡明的方法就是為自己定位。以中國而言，不爭全球主導，不爭全球第二/最大的” 反第一勢力” ，力爭東亞主導(連日本亦要爭取過來)，力爭最有影響力的第三勢力，從而爭取時間和空間在受最少外力干擾下完成國內政治和經濟的改革，是為最合當前甚至三十年內中國的國際定位。
順帶一提，我一直看到壇友提出“遠交近攻” 甚麼的來提出“聯美制俄”和“聯美制日”。先不論後兩者；遠交近攻既有秦滅六國的成功例子，亦有金滅遼後再滅北宋的失敗例子。聯美制俄還是聯美制日，關鍵根本不是中國民主與否，而是中國究竟會否和能否成為美國最大的競爭對手，或者被美國弄為假想敵。這是以國際權力爭鬥而不是什麼理念為基礎的。美國打伊拉克，是打給世界特別是歐洲看，回應回應你這個歐盟和歐羅有機會帶來的競爭。法國叫得最厲害，皆因西歐中以法國在中東有最大利益。
以現時的情勢來說，美國仍然是把中國當作最大的兩個假想敵之一（另一個當然是俄國）；日本對美國則根本不痛不癢—琪子而已。把日本納入導彈防禦系統是一把雙刃刀：既可以向著中俄，又可以控制了日本本身的軍隊—誰知道美國賣給日本的設備中會不會有”over-ride” 或突然死亡的裝置以防止日本反骨？如此美國對中國” 制日” 毫無需求；至於制俄：要是中國的實力/潛力比俄國更強，制來作甚？反之亦然。美國的重點仍然是讓中俄兩國互相制衡，誰強就傾斜另一方。中俄亦然。所以老鄧的養晦韜光的策略，把盡可能把俄國頂上去然後自己跟在身後，又或者就算俄弱更不能乘機踐踏以多樹美國的敵人才能就中取事，方為對策。
AND :
不論制還是防，甚至攻，說到底都是製造/改變形勢使敵就我。現代的利益並不單止在人和土地，尚有貿易，知識以及衍生出來的價值觀。因此，國際關係變得多樣和自相矛盾化，難以只用一種觀念和策略貫穿。外交和戰略也變得不穩定和多變。要在這種形勢下不被環境牽著走，較簡明的方法就是為自己定位。以中國而言，不爭全球主導，不爭全球第二/最大的” 反第一勢力” ，力爭東亞主導(連日本亦要爭取過來)，力爭最有影響力的第三勢力，從而爭取時間和空間在受最少外力干擾下完成國內政治和經濟的改革，是為最合當前甚至三十年內中國的國際定位。
Thursday, March 12, 2009
一於講下花旗銀行
唔好誤會，小弟委實未有時間詳細閱讀花旗報表，唔敢”亂說亂動” 。求求其其看了yahoo finance的季度報表，發現何以在以往06和07年於收入欄沒報cost of revenue，但係到08年無啦啦就有約15% of revenue係 cost of revenue? 如果睇埋季表，點解係6月有25%的cost of revenue，到九月忽然回撥約等於30% 當季revenue作reverse cost of revenue？睇下張balance sheet, 到去年年底資產有1,938b，不過負債就係1,797b，股本得個141b，如果劈走埋D虛到唔恨既goodwill和intangible asset的41b，就得100b咁多，5.2%乍。再睇睇茄殊flow，睇怕又係係D account receivable做過手腳，而且call左一堆loan，所以好野到可以失驚無神拿番89b既未收款番來—但係call左loan，你的尊貴客戶打左柴，以後既收入點算？仲有D不明資金約152b入左operating cash flow到，咁架勢？表面睇Finance的cash flow好似還緊債，但係一睇季表，撞鬼lor，係最後一季借錢12b，問股東度水45b，搞左一大輪，淨現金流出都仲有34b，咁又點算？依家話一二月賺錢，到底夠唔夠俾息？夠唔夠支持資本比率？佢到底仲有幾多at large野？真係木宰羊啦。
廢話到此，眾巴打絲士打點睇？請湧躍討論啦！
廢話到此，眾巴打絲士打點睇？請湧躍討論啦！
Wednesday, March 11, 2009
黃金的多面性
黃金有多面性：既是裝飾用，又因為其保值能力作為管理風險的工具，更有作為貨幣的價值，因此它的行為也很多樣。如果根據去年的數據，黃金作為裝飾用的需求下跌，因此其作為後兩者的目也就顯得重要。此兩者，後面的因素受投資者對紙幣的信心而改變；前者則受其他資本市場表現而轉化。
現時儘管美元被大量印刷，而且由10年期以上的T-Bond和同年期的TIPS息差來看，市場預期通漲不斷惡化。就算以2年期到5年期的T-Note的孳息走勢來看，市場對美元的興趣也有減少。但是，以4個星期，3個月和6個月的短期T-bill來看，卻依然有相當需求，這固然因為資本市場不穩定，但是也因為其他主要貨幣，除人民幣外，比美元更不濟，市場所以短期內尚未放棄美元，亦成為黃金作為後備貨幣的角色的主要競爭對手，結果是黃金作為避險的角色成為主要。
不過，雖然黃金現時作為資本市場的避險角色是最重要，但是也不能完全就和資本市場玩相反方向即可。由於黃金有了一直上升的總需求，成交這幾年越來越活躍，所以炒賣的情況一樣劇烈，因此如果美元流通充足(而不是吸入資產負債表的量遠高於流出市面的量) ，而現在對未來的估計又個個不同，絕對有可能同時炒股債金，造成股金或金債之間的相反關係短暫脫勾。
在現時市場的期望和對後市的分析如此模糊的情況下，各技術分析的工具未必能對市場下一步作出較有意義的估計，不過如果即期，下期如果分析及以後的期金和期金期貨的情形，留意最多未平倉合約的價位，或許能對後市有個概念。詳情請參參小弟的blog的舊post(應該在二月份或一月份的) 。
現時儘管美元被大量印刷，而且由10年期以上的T-Bond和同年期的TIPS息差來看，市場預期通漲不斷惡化。就算以2年期到5年期的T-Note的孳息走勢來看，市場對美元的興趣也有減少。但是，以4個星期，3個月和6個月的短期T-bill來看，卻依然有相當需求，這固然因為資本市場不穩定，但是也因為其他主要貨幣，除人民幣外，比美元更不濟，市場所以短期內尚未放棄美元，亦成為黃金作為後備貨幣的角色的主要競爭對手，結果是黃金作為避險的角色成為主要。
不過，雖然黃金現時作為資本市場的避險角色是最重要，但是也不能完全就和資本市場玩相反方向即可。由於黃金有了一直上升的總需求，成交這幾年越來越活躍，所以炒賣的情況一樣劇烈，因此如果美元流通充足(而不是吸入資產負債表的量遠高於流出市面的量) ，而現在對未來的估計又個個不同，絕對有可能同時炒股債金，造成股金或金債之間的相反關係短暫脫勾。
在現時市場的期望和對後市的分析如此模糊的情況下，各技術分析的工具未必能對市場下一步作出較有意義的估計，不過如果即期，下期如果分析及以後的期金和期金期貨的情形，留意最多未平倉合約的價位，或許能對後市有個概念。詳情請參參小弟的blog的舊post(應該在二月份或一月份的) 。
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
關於匯豐
供，不供；買，不買；賣，不賣；這些都是極為個人的決定。這沒有標準答案。可是，有些因素卻不可不察的。
首先要問自己，買匯豐的目的是賺大比數無限制升幅（即止蝕唔止賺），還是賺至目標升幅即離場？
如果是前者，有兩個問題問自己：為什麼預期有大比數無限制升幅？是因為環景好，行業好，公司好這些基本因素，還是純粹是極度超賣？
聰明的壇友一定能看得出，“極度超賣” 其實是一個偽命題：哪有“極度超賣” 是可以預期有大比數無限制升幅？極度超賣看的是技術層面：當股票短期內極度超賣，市場自然有人入市去搏反彈或者真正回升。但是，到底何者才是最終結果，就要回看基本因素。以匯豐而言，經營環景只有ok與差甚至極差的分別—縱使較不受影響的亞太地區，亦必定會面對激烈的競爭，尤其是國有銀行。行業方面就更不用說，既是海嘯源頭，而且到現在為止還未看到資產貶值潮的結束，能好得了哪裡？至於匯控本身問題多多；單是股東內鬥已經可以” 玩殘” 股價，更不用說其現金外流，資本不足，以及歐美業務尾大不掉的老問題了。最可怕的是，到現在為止，尚未見到匯控管理層悔過並改革—當然，19號艾力” 騎士” 會否逼匯控高層下台，又是否成功，是另外一個故事，現略去不提。
這樣一來，玩匯豐的原因，無非就是技術性超賣，即價格問題，而不是價值問題。
接下來的問題很清晰：以什麼價賣？如何去定？這個價格能出到貨嗎？
這是大難題！為什麼？” 人人言殊” 。
單是計價方法都好幾款，更惶論每個人對” 賺幾多先夠” 都感覺不同。在現時人心惶惶，大戶又操上操落，訊息極度混亂，前景又不明朗的情況下，市價往往”冇譜” ，變化又很急遽，試問要想賺盡就走，談何容易？要猜大戶想怎樣，就算猜中，落過場的都知道，隨時可以有價無市，那就極為” 冇癮” 了。
所以，想玩十八摸，就要衡量自己的功夫夠不夠，紀律性夠不夠，一達到目標價就不理會後市是否再狂飆都要離場，一旦到止蝕位就不管有冇機會反彈都止蝕沽出，而且要有點市場觸角：不然你訂下目標價是一個月內70元，則實現的機會有多大？另外，再抽離點看，如同Rightsider兄，羅兄，竹本兄，和其他壇友都指出過：機會成本的問題。要達到同樣的賺錢，是否非要買匯控不可？竹本兄早前透露過不少可賺的股份，西門兄又做過專題討論，這些都比只看匯控更有意思。至於Rightsider兄，VicktorCapitalist兄，羅兄，小弟和很多壇友亦論及黃金，外匯，和債卷這些工具。既然有如此多的選擇，為什麼不多討論這些選擇？
首先要問自己，買匯豐的目的是賺大比數無限制升幅（即止蝕唔止賺），還是賺至目標升幅即離場？
如果是前者，有兩個問題問自己：為什麼預期有大比數無限制升幅？是因為環景好，行業好，公司好這些基本因素，還是純粹是極度超賣？
聰明的壇友一定能看得出，“極度超賣” 其實是一個偽命題：哪有“極度超賣” 是可以預期有大比數無限制升幅？極度超賣看的是技術層面：當股票短期內極度超賣，市場自然有人入市去搏反彈或者真正回升。但是，到底何者才是最終結果，就要回看基本因素。以匯豐而言，經營環景只有ok與差甚至極差的分別—縱使較不受影響的亞太地區，亦必定會面對激烈的競爭，尤其是國有銀行。行業方面就更不用說，既是海嘯源頭，而且到現在為止還未看到資產貶值潮的結束，能好得了哪裡？至於匯控本身問題多多；單是股東內鬥已經可以” 玩殘” 股價，更不用說其現金外流，資本不足，以及歐美業務尾大不掉的老問題了。最可怕的是，到現在為止，尚未見到匯控管理層悔過並改革—當然，19號艾力” 騎士” 會否逼匯控高層下台，又是否成功，是另外一個故事，現略去不提。
這樣一來，玩匯豐的原因，無非就是技術性超賣，即價格問題，而不是價值問題。
接下來的問題很清晰：以什麼價賣？如何去定？這個價格能出到貨嗎？
這是大難題！為什麼？” 人人言殊” 。
單是計價方法都好幾款，更惶論每個人對” 賺幾多先夠” 都感覺不同。在現時人心惶惶，大戶又操上操落，訊息極度混亂，前景又不明朗的情況下，市價往往”冇譜” ，變化又很急遽，試問要想賺盡就走，談何容易？要猜大戶想怎樣，就算猜中，落過場的都知道，隨時可以有價無市，那就極為” 冇癮” 了。
所以，想玩十八摸，就要衡量自己的功夫夠不夠，紀律性夠不夠，一達到目標價就不理會後市是否再狂飆都要離場，一旦到止蝕位就不管有冇機會反彈都止蝕沽出，而且要有點市場觸角：不然你訂下目標價是一個月內70元，則實現的機會有多大？另外，再抽離點看，如同Rightsider兄，羅兄，竹本兄，和其他壇友都指出過：機會成本的問題。要達到同樣的賺錢，是否非要買匯控不可？竹本兄早前透露過不少可賺的股份，西門兄又做過專題討論，這些都比只看匯控更有意思。至於Rightsider兄，VicktorCapitalist兄，羅兄，小弟和很多壇友亦論及黃金，外匯，和債卷這些工具。既然有如此多的選擇，為什麼不多討論這些選擇？
Sunday, March 8, 2009
華潤創業
Let me initiate some discussions first. I have not done detailed studies on it so my opinion is only preliminary.
According to the 2008 interium report:
Gross Margin is about 24.5%,
Profit Margin is about 5.4%,
ROE is 5.16%,
ROA is 2.53%,
Quick Ratio is 0.83%,
Current Ratio is 1.086%,
Debt/Equity Ratio is 0.27%.
From credit side, it does not have sttrong burden on debt and low interest expense. The survival of the group will not be a big problem. Its discrepency bewtween current and quick ratios tell that the cash cycle may be slow despite it is in a cash-based business. In other words, its efficiency of selling still requires improvement.
It also reflects that the selling expenses take a heavy part despite the cost of goods sold. Considering the 3 breweries it will aquire only have utilization of production capacity of 50% or lower, China Resources may not achieve the planned synergy profit had it not improved its selling efficiency.
The low ROE and ROA are the characteristics of basic food and drinks retails. Yet, the P/E of the purchase price, 11.12, with a projected EPS as 0.62 * 2(for whole year) = 1.24, will be 8.96. If we inverse the ratio, it will be 0.1115. Assume the market price of stock only represent the value of equity, at this P/E we expect a ROE of 11.15%, while the actual ROE is only 5.16%, a discount of 54%. From this point of view, the stock may be over-priced for the moment. Nevertheless, under the current situation, China Resources's business may provide a good capital shelter. Had it focused on improving sales efficiency, it would have strong potential to further develop.
My humble 2 cents.
According to the 2008 interium report:
Gross Margin is about 24.5%,
Profit Margin is about 5.4%,
ROE is 5.16%,
ROA is 2.53%,
Quick Ratio is 0.83%,
Current Ratio is 1.086%,
Debt/Equity Ratio is 0.27%.
From credit side, it does not have sttrong burden on debt and low interest expense. The survival of the group will not be a big problem. Its discrepency bewtween current and quick ratios tell that the cash cycle may be slow despite it is in a cash-based business. In other words, its efficiency of selling still requires improvement.
It also reflects that the selling expenses take a heavy part despite the cost of goods sold. Considering the 3 breweries it will aquire only have utilization of production capacity of 50% or lower, China Resources may not achieve the planned synergy profit had it not improved its selling efficiency.
The low ROE and ROA are the characteristics of basic food and drinks retails. Yet, the P/E of the purchase price, 11.12, with a projected EPS as 0.62 * 2(for whole year) = 1.24, will be 8.96. If we inverse the ratio, it will be 0.1115. Assume the market price of stock only represent the value of equity, at this P/E we expect a ROE of 11.15%, while the actual ROE is only 5.16%, a discount of 54%. From this point of view, the stock may be over-priced for the moment. Nevertheless, under the current situation, China Resources's business may provide a good capital shelter. Had it focused on improving sales efficiency, it would have strong potential to further develop.
My humble 2 cents.
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
Pro HSBC: Corporate Bond Yield and AAA Banking and Finance Rate Rise
While we focus on HSBC, other figures may signal another wave of problems:
Meanwhile, mortgage rate in USA has still been stable and not subjected to large fluctuation.
Gold price is 926.70USD/ounce; Brent oil is 43.65USD/barrel. The former one has been dropping while the latter one is stablizing and even rising a bit.
From the figures above, the risk of corporate bankrupcy or under the risk of bankrupcy has been increasing. Another horrible phenomenon is that the traditional safe havens, bonds and gold, both have their prices decreased. Considering the re-tightening of credits and available capital and even potential issuance of rights by banks and corporates due to adverse result announcement (and expectation by the market about bankrupcy or at least heavy debt), the available fund in the market will be sucked to the "black holes" due to massive write-off. It also hints that another wave of not only stock market drops but may also be all market drop (and even further job cut) are coming. Seat tight, fasten your seat belt, and prepare!
- Corporate Bond Yield, investment grade average = 7.38%, already up from 6.xx last month.
- 5-year AAA banking and finance rate = 5.91% up from 4.96% 1 month prior.
- 10-year AAA banking and finance rate = 6.76% up from 5.77% 1 month prior.
- 3-month TED rises to 1% after a month of contraction; 1-month UST even rose to 0.51%.
- While short-term UST price remains stable, long-term UST price has been dropping. UK, Germany, Australia, and Brazil all follow the same trend. (another hint about HSBC: except China and HK, most of its other major markets are suffering from confidence problems).
- CDS index of USD has been increasing to 170pts on average. The trend has been picking up on all sectors.
Meanwhile, mortgage rate in USA has still been stable and not subjected to large fluctuation.
Gold price is 926.70USD/ounce; Brent oil is 43.65USD/barrel. The former one has been dropping while the latter one is stablizing and even rising a bit.
From the figures above, the risk of corporate bankrupcy or under the risk of bankrupcy has been increasing. Another horrible phenomenon is that the traditional safe havens, bonds and gold, both have their prices decreased. Considering the re-tightening of credits and available capital and even potential issuance of rights by banks and corporates due to adverse result announcement (and expectation by the market about bankrupcy or at least heavy debt), the available fund in the market will be sucked to the "black holes" due to massive write-off. It also hints that another wave of not only stock market drops but may also be all market drop (and even further job cut) are coming. Seat tight, fasten your seat belt, and prepare!
Sunday, March 1, 2009
A Property in Shanghai - Inspirations
On the Saturaday I went to an open-house in the Zhong-shan Park in Chang-ling area of Shanghai City. The developer is 麗新. Offical mortgage provider is Hang Seng Bank (China).
There is a big gardern at the middle of the complex with the full-facility club house. Underground parkade is located under the garden and each parking space is sold separately from the suite. Surroundings are a famous gigantic shopping mall with 3 subway lines intersected. Office towers (one of which locates Accenture's Shanghai office) are in walking distance. Yet by heritage this area was used to be a mid-low class residential area only.
6 Blocks were all sold and fully occupied on phase 1 around 2007-Oct. 3 blocks of Phase 2 has been on sale ever since 2008-April.
The units on sold are of the sizes 100sqm and 145sqm. By the drawings provided and actual inspection, the utilization rates (excluding even the balcony) are 78% and 84% respectively.
The indicative price are as follows:
1. Floor 1-5: RMB25,000/sqm
2. Floor 5-10: RMB25,000-27,000/sqm
3. Floor 10-25: RMB27,000-29,000/sqm
4. Floor 25 up: RMB29,000-32,000/sqm
I have checked the rental prices of similar suites in the surroundings. For apartment unit of an area around 140sqm at the middle high storey, the rental will be 12000RMB/month (tax included). It is about 86RMB/sqm/month. Therefore, rental return is about 86x12/28000 = 3.68% only.
There is a big gardern at the middle of the complex with the full-facility club house. Underground parkade is located under the garden and each parking space is sold separately from the suite. Surroundings are a famous gigantic shopping mall with 3 subway lines intersected. Office towers (one of which locates Accenture's Shanghai office) are in walking distance. Yet by heritage this area was used to be a mid-low class residential area only.
6 Blocks were all sold and fully occupied on phase 1 around 2007-Oct. 3 blocks of Phase 2 has been on sale ever since 2008-April.
The units on sold are of the sizes 100sqm and 145sqm. By the drawings provided and actual inspection, the utilization rates (excluding even the balcony) are 78% and 84% respectively.
The indicative price are as follows:
1. Floor 1-5: RMB25,000/sqm
2. Floor 5-10: RMB25,000-27,000/sqm
3. Floor 10-25: RMB27,000-29,000/sqm
4. Floor 25 up: RMB29,000-32,000/sqm
I have checked the rental prices of similar suites in the surroundings. For apartment unit of an area around 140sqm at the middle high storey, the rental will be 12000RMB/month (tax included). It is about 86RMB/sqm/month. Therefore, rental return is about 86x12/28000 = 3.68% only.
While in recent time the Shanghai property in the same area should have decreased by 10-15% according to the statistics, there are new properties, like this one, have their price level stayed high and rigid. Is there any reason behind it?
Let me do a wild guess.
This apartment's phase 2 started selling on 2008-April, and phase 1 started half a year earlier which was on 2007-Nov. Usually it took 1.5-2 years to complete the construction of the complex. Therefore, construction should start around 2005 Nov to 2006-May. By practice it will take 1-1.5 year to complete the feasibility studies to land bidding and mobilization process. Hence, the land should be bought around the period of 2004 May - 2005 May. During that period, the land at that area should be priced around RMB6,000-8,000/sqm. Construction cost is RMB3,000/sqm, including interior decoration. Assume another RMB1,000/sqm for general administration and promotion, then the total cost, per land base, is RMB10,000 - 12,000/sqm.
Simply by the utilization rate of 78 - 83%, the actual selling price for the available-to-sell area can be around RMB14,400 - 15,400/sqm. Now, by the time they sold the units, the average price of such complex in such area has already escalated to RMB29,000-33,000/sqm. Thus, the units should have generated a profit margin of 88.3% - 129%.
With reference to the developer, the occupency rate is 100% of phase 1, 15% of phase 2. Thus the total occupency rate of the entire complex (as phase 1 is equal to phase 2), will be 50% + 7.5% = 57.5%. Assume the developer has exaggerated by 20%; an actual occupency rate of 46% is recorded. Therefore the actual profit margin is in the range of -13.3% - 5.4% based on the selling price for the available-to-sell area. If we calculate in the actual cost being distributed on every bit of the area, the profit margin is in the range of 11.1% - 51.8%.
On the other hand, recently the transaction volume is low, and the anchorage price has not dropped since 2008. The insufficient transaction will allow the developers which have sufficient cash in hand to continue a high-price policy without risking of losing market shares. Also, the low volume of selling, amidst a worsening environment, cannot be altered with a lower price (since the interest of purchase depends not on the price but on the willingness of the potential buyers).
From the little analysis shown above, the motivation for the developer to lower the price is not sufficient. The marginal profit gained by lowering price for larger volume is not sufficient to cover the marginal cost. Furthermore, the developer, just by the previous sales, has already earnt sufficient profit (to please the investors) and cash flow to sustain further operations. For developers with similar financial strength, most of which are from Hong Kong, may be able to hold off for a longer period and even make bigger profits during recovery.
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